


STAKEHOLDER PERFORMANCE SCORECARD

SITUATION ROOM ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY TRACKER (SEAT) 



SEPTEMBER 2026

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



The Situation Room Electoral Accountability Tracker (SEAT) Stakeholder Performance Scorecard for **September 2026** comes at a critical stage in preparations for the 2027 General Elections. While the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) continued to advance its operational preparations, developments during the month showed that electoral credibility will depend on much more than technical readiness. The Supreme Court's restoration of provisions of the Electoral Act 2026 relating to party membership registers and candidate nominations also brought renewed attention to political parties' compliance with electoral law. Meanwhile, disputes over primaries, candidate eligibility, substitutions and party structures continued across several states, exposing persistent weaknesses in internal party democracy and dispute resolution.

Situation Room's daily election news tracking of the political environment also showed signs of increasing tension. Reports of clashes involving political supporters, attacks on opposition activities, intimidation and inflammatory rhetoric raised concerns about the safety and fairness of political participation. These developments are particularly troubling following the signing of the 2027 Peace Accord facilitated by the National Peace Committee. The challenge is now to ensure that political parties, candidates and their supporters honour their commitments and face consequences for violations.

Security remained a major concern. Continued attacks, killings and kidnappings in parts of the country, alongside the deaths of 37 suspected illegal miners in Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) custody in Niger State, raised questions about citizens' safety, the conduct of security personnel and accountability for abuses. Investigations and the suspension of officers following the Niger incident were important steps, but their value will depend on transparent findings and appropriate consequences where wrongdoing is established. The advancement of the State Police constitutional amendment also brought the question of decentralised security to the fore. Although State Police could improve local intelligence and response, its success will depend on safeguards against political interference, protection of citizens' rights and effective oversight. The reform must not create additional opportunities for the State Governors to use security structures to their advantage.

Concerns about institutional performance extended to the National Assembly and the wider Executive. The National Assembly's prolonged recesses, limited sitting days and repeated extension of the 2025 capital budget implementation period also raised questions about legislative effectiveness. These developments matter because credible elections require institutions that are not only functional, but also accountable and able to operate without undue political influence.

Another concern is the growing threat of manipulated information, including AI-generated fake results, deepfakes and misleading political content. As campaigning intensifies, such material could undermine public confidence, inflame tensions and make it harder for citizens to distinguish verified information from false claims. Civil society organisations remained active in defending electoral integrity and civic freedoms. However, these efforts will have greater impact when supported by sustained evidence gathering, citizen engagement and follow-up with responsible institutions. Stronger coordination among civil society organisations is particularly important as the political contest intensifies.

Finally, September showed that Nigeria is entering the 2027 electoral cycle with stronger evidence of technical preparation but continuing weaknesses in the wider democratic environment. The central issue for the months ahead is therefore not simply whether Nigeria can conduct an election, but whether it can create an environment in which citizens can freely participate, political parties can compete fairly, institutions can act independently and security agencies can protect all participants without political bias. With the January 2027 presidential and National Assembly elections now only months away, the credibility of the election will increasingly be determined not only by INEC's performance on election day, but by the conduct of political actors and institutions before election day.



ASSESSING STAKEHOLDER PREPAREDNESS AGAINST SITUATION ROOM'S CREDIBILITY THRESHOLD FOR THE 2027 GENERAL ELECTIONS



METHODOLOGY

The SEAT Stakeholder Performance Scorecard assesses the preparedness and performance of key electoral stakeholders against expectations contained in Situation Room's Credibility Threshold for the 2027 General Elections. The performance ratings are intended to provide an objective assessment of preparedness ahead of the 2027 General Elections using Situation Room election observation findings, stakeholder engagements, media reports and publicly available institutional reports on developments recorded during the review period.

COMPLIANCE/TREND RATING:

RATING	INTERPRETATION
0	NO COMPLIANCE
1	VERY WEAK COMPLIANCE
2	PARTIAL COMPLIANCE
3	MODERATE COMPLIANCE
4	STRONG COMPLIANCE
5	FULL COMPLIANCE

TREND	INTERPRETATION
GREEN	IMPROVING
AMBER	STATIC
RED	DECLINING

STAKEHOLDER	TREND	STATUS / ACCOUNTABILITY SCORE	INSIGHT ON PERFORMANCE
INEC	↑ Improving	Strong Compliance (4/5)	INEC demonstrated a marked improvement in operational preparedness during September. The Commission is set to launch a real-time election readiness tracker (<u>This Day Live</u>), continued its zonal readiness assessments, announced 9th October 2026 for the commencement of nationwide PVC collection and reported more than 10.7 million new registrations from the three phases of CVR (<u>Channels TV</u>). INEC also continued to test and strengthen its systems through the September bye-elections, with its results portal recording very high levels of result uploads. (<u>Channels TV</u>). However, operational preparedness must be matched by stronger public confidence in the Commission's neutrality and transparency. Concerns over the proposed use of Artificial Intelligence (AI), the integrity of candidate lists and calls for greater clarity around the Commission's technology and decision-making processes show that trust remains a significant vulnerability (<u>Daily Trust</u>). INEC's warning that AI-generated content could threaten the elections also reveals the need for a clear public framework on how such risks will be identified and addressed (<u>The Guardian</u>).

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SECURITY AGENCIES	→ Static	Partial Compliance (2/5)	September presented a sharp contradiction in security preparedness. On one hand, the Nigeria Police Force developed a dedicated security roadmap for the 2027 elections, explored AI and data-driven policing and the Inspector-General of Police warned officers against political bias, stating that personnel who collude with political actors or abuse their powers would be investigated and punished (Premium Times Nigeria). The Army also commenced election-related training with an emphasis on rights and political neutrality (Vanguard News). On the other hand, insecurity remained widespread, with litany of killings, kidnappings and attacks recorded in Plateau, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kano, Benue, just to mention a few. The unfortunate death of 37 miners in the Niger State NSCDC custody also raises concern over the protection of human rights as well as reveals the gaps surrounding mining operations in Nigeria (Premium Times). As campaigns intensified, there were reports of the arrest of five persons in Maiduguri, Borno State, over T-shirts bearing the inscription "Tinubu Must Go". The men were charged with criminal conspiracy, inciting disturbance,

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			disturbance of public peace and thuggery, with the police alleging that the T-shirts were intended to cause a breach of public peace. The incident raised concerns about the protection of freedom of expression and the risk of security measures being used to restrict political dissent (Premium Times; Punch). More troubling were incidents of political violence, like the clash between police and ADC supporters in Kaduna at the beginning of the campaign period (Premium Times Nigeria). All these demonstrates that having an election security strategy is not enough. The real test will be whether security agencies can apply the strategy consistently and impartially, particularly where political actors or state authorities are involved. September therefore showed insufficient evidence that the wider security environment has become substantially safer or that political neutrality is yet guaranteed.
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY	→ Static	Partial Compliance (2/5)	In September, the National Assembly transmitted the constitutional amendment proposals on State Police to the 36 State Houses of Assembly, placing one of the most consequential security reforms before state legislatures (Premium Times Nigeria).

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			However, the timing of such a fundamental security reform (only months before the 2027 elections) raises concerns about preparedness, the risk of abuse by state governors and the overall quality of legislative oversight in Nigeria (The Cable). Although the proposed amendment contains safeguards on political interference, funding, recruitment, discipline and federal intervention, the effectiveness of these safeguards will depend on the subsequent legislation and implementation framework. By the end of September, only Edo, Osun, Rivers and Oyo States had approved the amendment, with other states still considering it, suggesting that broad consensus had not yet been achieved (Nigeria Info). At least 24 States will have concur for it to make progress (Section 9 of the Constitution which requires the concurrence of at least two-thirds of the 36 State Houses of Assembly). The legislative efficiency of the National Assembly also remains a concern. PLAC reported that since June 2023, the 10th National Assembly had spent 581 of 1,003 days away from plenary, including only 141 sitting days in 2025 against the constitutional minimum of 181 (PLAC Legist).

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			In September, lawmakers returned after a 68-day recess only to adjourn again until 13th October 2026. The fourth extension of the 2025 capital budget to December 2026 further raises questions about budget discipline and oversight, particularly as ₦5.71 trillion worth of projects was identified as unfinished projects carried into the 2026 budget (PLAC Legist). The National Assembly is therefore showing greater activity on reforms directly relevant to 2027, but its performance will ultimately be judged by whether those reforms strengthen democratic accountability rather than simply expand institutional powers.
JUDICIARY	↑ Improving	Moderate Compliance (3/5)	In September, the Supreme Court restored Sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026 after the Court of Appeal had struck them down. Sections 77(5)-(7) require political parties to submit their membership registers to INEC at least 21 days before primaries, use the submitted register for the exercise and risk losing the right to field candidates if they fail to comply, while Section 84(2) requires parties to nominate candidates through direct primaries or consensus. The Supreme Court's decision therefore does not introduce new

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			requirements but confirms that these provisions of the Electoral Act 2026 are constitutionally valid and enforceable. This provides greater legal certainty for INEC and political parties, but also raises practical questions about how the restored provisions will affect primaries and nominations conducted while the Court of Appeal judgment was in force (<u>Premium Times Nigeria</u>). The courts also continued to intervene in party nomination disputes, including the Federal High Court's nullification of PDP's Gombe Governorship primary that produced Isa Pantami and its order for a fresh primary (<u>Premium Times Nigeria</u>). The Judiciary also demonstrated its role in responding to the wider security crisis, with the Edo State Special Criminal Court sentencing four people to death for kidnapping and cult-related offences. The judgment is significant as a demonstration that specialised courts can deliver consequences for serious crimes in a context of widespread insecurity. However, the continued use of the death penalty raises broader concerns around the right to life, the possibility of wrongful convictions and Nigeria's continuing reliance on capital punishment (<u>Premium Times Nigeria</u>).

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POLITICAL PARTIES	↓ Declining	Very Weak Compliance (1/5)	Political parties remained arguably the weakest-performing stakeholders during September. Rather than demonstrating stronger internal democracy as campaigns commenced, parties continued to be characterised by factional disputes, competing primary results, candidate substitutions, defections and prolonged litigation. The problems cut across both ruling and opposition parties: the ADC faced disputes over candidate substitutions and power-sharing arrangements in Jigawa, while the PDP recorded further nomination disputes, including the Gombe governorship primary that was subsequently nullified by the court. (<u>Premium Times Nigeria; Premium Times Nigeria</u>) Large-scale defections and shifting opposition coalition arrangements also continued to make party structures weak. More concerning was the conduct of some political actors as campaigns began. The Kaduna confrontation between the Police and ADC supporters was among the early signs of a more confrontational campaign environment, while political activities elsewhere were accompanied by attacks, intimidation and inflammatory rhetoric. (<u>Premium Times Nigeria</u>).

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			The scale of these concerns is reflected in the National Peace Committee's Election Security Information Hub, which recorded 60 election-related incidents between 19th August and 19th September, including political violence, intimidation, threats, attacks on political activities and misinformation. Misinformation and disinformation accounted for 24 of the incidents. The Committee noted that many of the incidents occurred despite the commitments made by political parties and candidates under the 2027 National Peace Accord (<u>The Guardian Nigeria; Punch Nigeria</u>). Edo State also illustrates the more coercive dimension of political mobilisation. In September, the Chairman of Esan West Local Government Area, Blessing Ebhodaghe, reportedly directed commercial drivers at a motor park to wear All Progressives Congress (APC) caps or other party materials and warned that drivers displaying opposition party materials could be denied access to the park (<u>Journalist101</u>). This raises concerns about the use of public or community spaces to pressure citizens over their political choices. These concerns were reinforced immediately after the review period when Edo APC Chairman,

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			Jarrett Tenebe, reportedly referred to “AK-47 fire” against those who might obstruct the party’s plan to secure 2.5 million votes for President Bola Tinubu. The remark prompted calls from the African Democratic Congress and civil society actors for investigation by security agencies. <u>(The Cable; Punch Nigeria)</u>. While the statement falls outside the September review period, it is a significant early warning for the October assessment about the direction of political rhetoric as the 2027 campaign intensifies. The signing of the National Peace Accord is therefore increasingly being tested by the conduct of political actors. The 60 incidents tracked by the National Peace Committee, together with subsequent inflammatory statements, suggest that signing an accord is not sufficient without mechanisms for monitoring, accountability and consequences for violations.
PRESIDENCY / GOVERNMENT	→ Static	Partial Compliance (2/5)	The President supported the constitutional process for State Police and directed the Police to maintain political neutrality ahead of the 2027 elections, with the Inspector-General of Police also warning officers against colluding with political actors or abusing their powers <u>(Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation;</u>

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			<u>Premium Times Nigeria</u>). However, these assurances must be assessed against concerns about the use of state apparatus for partisan advantage. Section 99(2) of the Electoral Act 2026 expressly provides that “State apparatus including the media shall not be employed to the advantage or disadvantage of any political party or candidate at any election”, but unlike subsections (3) and (4) which deal with equal media time and airtime and are expressly criminalised under Section 99(6), the Act does not provide a specific offence or penalty for violating subsection (2). This creates an important accountability gap if public institutions, regulatory powers, security agencies or other state resources are used to influence political competition <u>(Electoral Act 2026; Centre for Social Justice)</u>. These concerns were central to Situation Room’s 15th September International Day of Democracy statement, which warned of the “weaponisation of public office”, voter intimidation, forced disenfranchisement, political thuggery and the use of public resources to secure political advantage. Situation Room specifically called for public institutions and security agencies to remain neutral and warned that public powers must not be

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			used to compel political loyalty or disadvantage opposition actors. <u>(Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room)</u>. The Federal Government also faced serious accountability concerns following the deaths of 37 suspected illegal miners in Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) custody in Niger State. President Tinubu ordered a transparent investigation, while the Niger State Government established a judicial commission and the Ministry of Interior suspended the Niger State Commandant and 20 other officers pending investigation <u>(Ministry of Interior; Channels Television)</u>. The President's extended absence from the country and non-attendance at the 81st United Nations General Assembly also generated public criticism and questions about executive accountability, although the Presidency maintained that he remained in contact with officials and continued to direct government business while abroad <u>(State House)</u>.
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS (CSOS)	↑ Improving	Strong Compliance (4/5)	Civil society organisations remained important accountability actors during September as their engagement beyond election observation to scrutinise the broader conditions necessary for credible elections.

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			On 15th September, the Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room warned of voter intimidation, political violence, the weaponisation of public office and the failure to hold influential political actors accountable, arguing that the credibility of the 2027 elections would depend on the political environment long before election day (<u>Situation Room statement, 15 September</u>). Other organisations raised concerns about the potential politicisation of academic, traditional and religious institutions, particularly where partisan affiliations could undermine public confidence in the neutrality of electoral officials and influential institutions (<u>The Guardian, 17 September</u>). Civil society also demonstrated its capacity for collective advocacy when organisations called for the withdrawal of the Foreign Aid Regulation, Transparency and Disclosure Bill, warning that it could create excessive government control over independent organisations and restrict civic space (<u>Premium Times, 30 September</u>). These interventions show that civil society is increasingly addressing the institutional and political conditions that shape democratic participation, rather

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			than focusing on election-day processes alone. However, public statements and advocacy will have limited impact without sustained monitoring, documented evidence, citizen engagement and follow-up with the relevant authorities.
MEDIA	↑ Improving	Moderate Compliance (3/5)	The media played an important watchdog role during September, reporting on political party disputes, electoral preparations, political violence, security failures and institutional controversies ahead of the 2027 General Elections. Investigative and analytical reporting helped expose emerging fault lines within political parties and raised questions about the credibility of the electoral environment. However, the quality of election coverage will depend not only on the volume of reporting but also on its ability to scrutinise political actors and public institutions, verify claims and provide citizens with reliable information. A major concern during the month was the growing threat of AI-generated fake election results, deepfakes, manipulated audio and other deceptive content, which could make electoral misinformation more difficult to detect and undermine public trust (Premium Times, 22 September).

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			As the 2027 elections approach, the media must strengthen fact-checking and digital verification, avoid amplifying unverified allegations and unofficial results, and continue to scrutinise those in power without fear or favour. Its contribution to electoral credibility will depend on balancing editorial independence with accuracy, fairness and responsible reporting.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN JULY 2026

1. INEC intensified preparations for the 2027 General Elections, including announcing plans to hold a World Press Conference/National Stakeholders' Meeting, launch a real-time election readiness tracker, conduct system testing and begin nationwide Permanent Voter Card (PVC) collection.
2. Political parties began formal campaign activities in the face of continuing defections, factional disputes, candidate-substitution controversies and pre-election litigation. Reports of intimidation, confrontations involving political supporters and inflammatory rhetoric also raised concerns about the safety of political participation.
3. The National Peace Committee's monitoring recorded 60 election-related incidents between 19th August and 19th September 2026, including violence, intimidation, threats and misinformation.
4. Security agencies continued election security planning and preparations, but persistent killings, kidnappings and attacks across several states exposed the gap between operational planning and the protection of citizens. Concerns about the political neutrality of security personnel and accountability for abuses, including the deaths of 37 suspected illegal miners in Niger State while in Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps custody, also highlighted weaknesses in institutional oversight.
5. The constitutional amendment process for State Police advanced to the State Houses of Assembly, but only Edo, Osun, Rivers and Oyo States had approved the proposal by the end of September.

6. The National Assembly's repeated recesses and the fourth extension of the 2025 capital budget implementation period to December 2026 raised concerns about legislative effectiveness, budget discipline and oversight.

7. The Supreme Court restored provisions of the Electoral Act 2026 relating to party membership registers and candidate nomination procedures, while other rulings on party primaries reinforced the Judiciary's role in enforcing electoral law and exposed continuing weaknesses in internal party processes.

8. Concerns about the credibility of the 2027 elections extended beyond election administration to include the political neutrality of public institutions, the use of state resources for partisan advantage, restrictions on civic space and press freedom, and the growing threat of AI-generated fake results, deepfakes and other manipulated content. Civil society organisations and media stakeholders called for stronger institutional accountability, protection of democratic freedoms and more responsible information-sharing.

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AUGUST 2026

The September 2026 SEAT Stakeholder Performance Scorecard shows that preparations for the 2027 General Elections are advancing, but operational readiness alone will not guarantee credible elections. Situation Room therefore recommends the following priority actions:

INEC

- **INEC** should provide regular public updates on its 2027 election readiness tracker, PVC collection, technology testing and contingency plans. It should clearly explain how failures in the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) or the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) will be handled, including the procedures for communicating disruptions and protecting the integrity of results.
- **INEC** should work with media organisations, fact-checkers, technology experts and civil society to establish a clear public communication and rapid-response framework for AI-generated fake results, deepfakes and other election-related misinformation. The framework should enable prompt verification and correction without compromising freedom of expression or allowing legitimate criticism to be labelled as disinformation.



SECURITY AGENCIES



Security agencies should strengthen intelligence-led prevention and rapid response to political violence, threats and attacks on campaign activities, candidates, supporters and electoral infrastructure. Reported incidents should be investigated promptly, with perpetrators held accountable irrespective of political affiliation, and findings communicated transparently where appropriate.


Security agencies and the Federal and State Governments should issue and enforce clear safeguards against the partisan use of security personnel and other public institutions. The Federal Government should also ensure transparent, independent investigations into deaths and alleged abuses in state custody, with appropriate disciplinary and legal consequences where wrongdoing is established.

POLITICAL PARTIES

- **Political parties and candidates** should comply with the Electoral Act 2026 and their party constitutions in conducting primaries, maintaining membership registers, selecting candidates and managing substitutions. Parties should strengthen transparent internal dispute-resolution processes and refrain from intimidation, coercion and practices that undermine internal democracy.
- **Political parties and candidates** should honour their commitments under the 2027 Peace Accord, refrain from inflammatory rhetoric and violence, and take responsibility for the conduct of their supporters. The National Peace Committee and relevant authorities should monitor compliance, document violations and press for timely investigation and appropriate sanctions.



NATIONAL ASSEMBLY



The National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly

should ensure that the State Police constitutional amendment process is informed by broad public consultation and a clear implementation framework. Any new policing structure should have enforceable safeguards for operational independence, human rights, transparent funding, recruitment and discipline, legislative oversight and protection against partisan control.

The National Assembly should strengthen legislative accountability by improving the regularity of plenary sittings, scrutinising budget implementation and addressing the repeated extension of capital budget deadlines.

JUDICIARY

The Judiciary should determine pre-election disputes promptly and consistently, particularly those involving party primaries, candidate eligibility, membership registers and candidate substitutions. Following the Supreme Court's restoration of provisions of the Electoral Act 2026, INEC and political parties should receive clear guidance on their application, including the implications for processes conducted while the earlier Court of Appeal judgment was in force.




GOVERNMENT



The Federal and State Governments should ensure that public resources, government institutions, security structures and administrative powers are not used to advantage or disadvantage political parties or candidates. The National Assembly should consider the enforceability gap relating to Section 99(2) of the Electoral Act 2026, which prohibits the partisan use of state apparatus but does not specify a corresponding offence or penalty, and pursue amendment in the next amendment process.

CSOS

- **Civil Society Organisations** should strengthen coordination and agree on shared advocacy priorities, common positions on critical democratic issues and coordinated responses to threats against civic space and electoral integrity. CSOs must prioritize unison, establish mechanisms for sharing information and responding collectively to violations, and guard against political actors exploiting divisions within the sector to weaken advocacy or draw organisations into partisan interests. This coordination should respect the independence and distinct roles of individual organisations.
- **Civil Society Organisations** should strengthen citizen-level engagement, voter education, election observation and monitoring of political violence, intimidation, disinformation and restrictions on political participation. Monitoring should be supported by documented evidence, clear reporting channels and follow-up with relevant authorities to encourage early intervention and accountability rather than relying on public statements alone.



● **Media Organisations** should strengthen editorial verification, fact-checking and digital investigation ahead of the 2027 elections, particularly when reporting on unofficial results, AI-generated content, manipulated media and inflammatory political claims. Newsrooms should avoid amplifying unverified allegations, provide context when reporting politically sensitive incidents and maintain independent scrutiny of public institutions. Government authorities and security agencies should respect press freedom and investigate reported harassment, intimidation and unlawful restrictions on journalists.

PEACE BUILDERS

- **The National Peace Committee, Traditional Rulers, Religious Leaders and other community leaders** should intensify non-partisan peace messaging, early warning and mediation in politically volatile areas. They should discourage the use of community institutions and public spaces to coerce political support and work with civil society, media and security agencies to respond to threats before they escalate into violence.



About SEAT

The Situation Room Electoral Accountability Tracker (SEAT) is the Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room's digital platform for promoting electoral transparency, accountability, and citizen participation.

SEAT provides timely election information, citizen reporting tools, data-driven insights, and election observation resources that strengthen democratic governance across Nigeria.

Through SEAT, citizens, observers, journalists, researchers, and stakeholders can access credible election data, monitor electoral developments, and contribute to safeguarding the integrity of Nigeria's democratic processes.

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