

PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE

# 2025 **Anambra State** Governorship Election





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OF THE 2025 ANAMBRA STATE  
GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

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2025 Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room

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# Table of Contents

■ Introduction	1
■ The Context of the 2025 Anambra State Governorship Election	4
■ Factors that will Determine the Race	12
■ INEC's Preparations	27
■ Recommendations	34
■ Appendices	36



# Introduction

The Anambra State governorship election will be held on 8 November 2025. The election will be the eighth in the series of governorship elections held in the State since Nigeria's return to civil rule in 1999. Governorship elections in Anambra State are remarkable for several reasons, including a history of controversial gubernatorial contests, the rise of a powerful regional political party, the persistent issue of low voter turnout, and significant security challenges. The 2025 governorship election highlights these issues amid a highly competitive field and rising violence.

Anambra State stands out as the only state in Nigeria that has produced four governors in four years (2003-2007), albeit under highly controversial circumstances. The chronicle of the state's governors since Nigeria's fourth republic includes Chinweoke Mbadinuju, who served as governor from 1999 to 2003 under the platform of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Mbadinuju's electoral victory in 1999 was reportedly masterminded by his political godfather Emeka Offor.<sup>1</sup>

In 2003, Mbadinuju lost his position to Chris Ngige, who had been selected by Chris Uba, a powerful political entrepreneur in the state, to stand in the elections. Through Uba's financial backing and political manoeuvrings, Ngige dislodged Mbadinuju, who was at odds with his own godfather, Emeka Offor.<sup>2</sup> Chris Ngige, who became the governor of Anambra State from 2003 to 2006 on the platform of the PDP, was removed on 17 March 2006 when the Court of Appeal in Enugu ruled that his electoral victory in 2003 was rigged.

Chris Ngige was succeeded by Peter Obi of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), who was later ousted by a faction of the Anambra State House of Assembly on 2 November 2006 and was replaced by Virginia Etiaba, his Deputy at that time.<sup>3</sup> However, the circumstances became more confounding as Etiaba was forced to return power to Peter Obi on 9 February 2007 after the Court of Appeal had nullified Obi's removal.

The governorship election of 14 April 2007, in which Andy Uba of the PDP was announced the governor, was declared illegal on 14 June 2007 by the Supreme Court, which replaced him with his predecessor, Peter Obi, citing illegality in Uba's election.<sup>4</sup> Remarkably, the Supreme Court's decision took Anambra State off the normal 4-year cycle of general elections in Nigeria.

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1 Ralph Ndigwe, "The Debacle: Direct Capture of People's Mandate in Anambra State," in Jibrin Ibrahim and Okechukwu Ibeanu eds., *Direct Capture: The 2007 Nigerian Elections and Subversion of Popular Sovereignty*, Abuja: Center for Democracy and Development, 2009.

2 Leena Hoffmann, "Fairy Godfathers and Magical Elections: Understanding the 2003 Electoral Crisis in Anambra State, Nigeria," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 48(2): 2010, pp. 285-310.

3 Chioma Gabriel, *Anambra Elections: The Past, Present, and Future*, Vanguard, 16 March 2013, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/03/anambra-elections-the-past-present-and-future/>.

4 HRW, *Criminal Politics: Violence, 'Godfathers' and Corruption in Nigeria*, Human Rights Watch Report 19, 16(A), 2007.

After completing his first term, Obi went ahead to seek reelection in what would become the first off-cycle governorship election in Nigeria, conducted on 6 February 2010.<sup>5</sup> His reelection was historic as he became the first governor of the state to serve a second term in office. Peter Obi's second term (2010-2014) ushered in a relatively more stable political dispensation for Anambra State. To a large extent, Obi's ascendancy challenged the pattern of personalised relationships and the influence of power and wealth in producing electoral victories in Anambra State.

Yet, Peter Obi himself played the role of a political godfather, ensuring that his protege Willie Obiano and his party, the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), retained power during the 2013 governorship election. Obiano's eight-year rule (2014-2022) strengthened APGA's dominance in the State, although a rift with Governor Obiano forced Peter Obi to resign from the party earlier in Obiano's tenure.

The advantages of incumbency have been decisive in APGA's two-decade rule in Anambra State. Like Peter Obi, Obiano supported his anointed candidate, Chukwuma Charles Soludo, during the 2021 governorship election. Analysts attribute Soludo's electoral victory mainly to support by the incumbent governor, APGA's dominance in the State, and Soludo's personal credentials.<sup>6</sup> Soludo has enjoyed a relatively high level of independence as a governor, considering that Obiano retreated to private life immediately after his handover in March 2022. Like the previous APGA governors, Soludo will fight his reelection without the interference of any political godfather, rather relying mainly on incumbency advantage and the predominance of APGA in the State. Overall, it appears that the pattern of personalised relationships and the influence of power and wealth that were at the centre of the crisis and controversies around the Anambra State governorship elections have weakened.

Although the chances of disorder arising from the activities of powerful political entrepreneurs have dwindled, the forthcoming governorship election in Anambra State has all the trappings of a contest that will command the attention of the stakeholders in Nigeria's electoral process. Among other things, the election is likely to be characterized by a high-stakes political contest involving efforts by the APGA to strengthen its dominance and pushback opposition by other parties, particularly the All Progressives Congress (APC). In addition, the election will be marked by strong mobilization of sectional identities, threats to voter participation and electoral integrity, as well as a strong involvement of security agencies. This foreboding draws from several factors, including the history of past elections in the State and early signposts of desperation and violence, fuelled by the underlying contestation among the various political gladiators in the State, the situation of mass poverty exacerbated by deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the country, and widespread insecurity in many parts of the State. The above-mentioned issues make it imperative for INEC to take adequate care in managing

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5 Tume Ahemba, Incumbent Declared Winner in Flawed Nigeria Poll, Reuters, 7 February 2010, <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/incumbent-declared-winner-in-flawed-nigeria-poll-idUSTRE6161Y6/>.

6 Incumbency, APGA Factor, Nnamdi Kanu's Ordeal... Six Reasons Soludo Won, <https://fij.ng/article/incumbency-apga-factor-nnamdi-kanus-ordeal-six-reasons-soludo-won/>.

the election and ensuring that the credibility of the electoral process is maintained. In this regard, the Commission must systematically address the challenges that affected the 2021 governorship and 2023 general elections in the State and apply the lessons learned from its post-election reviews to address issues that can undermine the credibility of the November election. The Commission needs to pay ample attention to areas of recurrent challenge, such as election logistics management, election technology management, management of election officials and staff, management of voters and voting infrastructure, information management and strategic communication, as well as engagement and mobilization of security agencies. In particular, there is an urgent need to address the security challenges that affected elections in some Local Government Areas of the State during the 2023 general election and the accompanying feeling of helplessness on the part of voters and citizens. This will require, among other things, focused engagement with key stakeholders, especially the security agencies, the traditional and religious leaders, as well as the youth population, based on a sustained campaign for peaceful elections.

This report presents an assessment of the broad geographical, demographic, political, and socio-economic context that will shape the conduct and outcome of the 2025 governorship election in Anambra State. The report provides useful insights into the history of elections in the State, an analysis of the socio-cultural aggregates that make up the State, and how political identities formed by these groups will shape political contests and the election. It also highlights the implications of insecurity for the election, including the challenges that widespread violence will pose to the election. The report further provides an assessment of the political developments in the State before the election, possible areas of concern during the election, and broad suggestions in terms of the role of stakeholders in making the outcome of the elections peaceful and credible.

## The Context of the 2025 Anambra State Governorship Election

Anambra State, named after the Anambra River,<sup>7</sup> was created when the former East Central State of Nigeria was split into Anambra and Imo States on 3 February 1976. The then Anambra State, with its capital in Enugu, comprised the present Anambra and Enugu States. A further re-organisation of the states in Nigeria on 27 August 1991 divided the old Anambra State into two States: Anambra and Enugu, with the capital of the present Anambra State in Awka. Besides Awka, other important towns in the present Anambra State include Onitsha, Nnewi, Ekwulobia, Ihiala, Obosi, Aguleri, Oko, and Ogidi. Anambra State has a history that stretches back to the 9th century AD, as revealed by archaeological excavations at Igbo-Ukwu and Ezira.<sup>8</sup> Great works of art in iron, bronze, copper, and pottery belonging to the ancient Kingdom of Nri revealed a sophisticated divine kingship administrative system that held sway in the area from 948 AD to 1911.<sup>9</sup>

Few States in Nigeria have as many neighbours as Anambra State, which shares boundaries with five states, namely Abia, Delta, Enugu, Imo, and Kogi States. The State has tropical rainforest vegetation, a humid climate with a temperature of about 87°F, and rainfall of between 152 cm and 203 cm.<sup>10</sup> Situated on rolling flat land on the eastern plains of the River Niger, the State has a population of 4,177,828 people, which puts it as the eighth-most populated state in Nigeria, according to the 2006 census.<sup>11</sup> Since the 2006 Census, the population of the State has grown exponentially, reaching an estimated 5.95 million people in 2022.<sup>12</sup> With a land area of 4,470 sq km, Anambra State is the second-most densely populated state in Nigeria, after Lagos State. The population density of the State is about 1,263 people per square kilometre; however, the stretch of more than 45 km between Oba and Amorka contains a cluster of numerous thickly populated villages and small towns, giving the area an estimated average density of 1,500 - 2,000 persons per square kilometre.<sup>13</sup>

7 Anambra is the anglicized version of 'Oma Mbalá', the native name of the Anambra River.

8 Anayo Okolie, After 25yrs of Chequered History, Anambra on the Path of Sustainable Growth, ThisDay, 4 September 2016, <https://www.thisdaylive.com/2016/09/04/after-25yrs-of-chequered-history-anambra-on-the-path-of-sustainable-growth/>.


9 Nigeria Governors Forum, Peer Review Report on Anambra State, 2010, <https://ngfrepository.org.ng:8443/jspui/bitstream/123456789/3600/1/Peer%20review%20on%20Anambra%20state.pdf>

10 Ibid.

11 <https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/resource/POPULATION%20PROJECTION%20Nigeria%20sgfn.xls>.

12 NPC, Nigeria Population Projections and Demographic Indicators, National And States, Abuja, National Population Commission, 2020, [https://factcheckhub.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/national-population-commission-Projection\\_2022.pdf](https://factcheckhub.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/national-population-commission-Projection_2022.pdf).

13 [https://www.citypopulation.de/en/nigeria/admin/NGA004\\_\\_anambra/](https://www.citypopulation.de/en/nigeria/admin/NGA004__anambra/).



Map of Nigeria highlighting Anambra State

While English is the official language, Anambra State is a predominantly Igbo-speaking State, with Igbo people constituting 98 percent of the population. There is a small population of Igala, constituting about 2 percent of the population, who live mainly in the North-Western part of the State. Christianity is the dominant religion in the State, though some adherents of traditional religion and Islam also live in the State. Among the Christian denominations, Catholics and Anglicans are the majority.

Like many Igbo communities, most of the communities in Anambra State are governed by a traditional ruler, and elderly male descendants of the lineages legislate and adjudicate on issues that concern their community. The traditional rulers are also the chief security officers and custodians of the customs and traditions of their respective communities. Sometimes, they liaise with the leadership of their town unions for security and development projects. Other governance institutions at the community level include Age Grades, Masquerade societies, and Women's Associations, such as the Umuada (group of first-married daughters).

Politically and administratively, Anambra State, like other States in Nigeria, is organized into three senatorial districts, namely Anambra Central (Awka), Anambra North (Onitsha), and Anambra South (Nnewi). The State has 11 Federal Constituencies, 30 State Constituencies, 21 Local Government Areas, and 326 Registration Areas or Wards. Details of the senatorial districts, federal and state constituencies, Local Government Areas and Registration Areas/Wards, as well as other electoral delimitation information, are shown in the Appendices. Anambra State has 179 officially recognized communities (51, 58, and 70 in Anambra North, Central, and South Senatorial zones), respectively. These communities are governed through town unions and associations. The communities form the foundation of the state's grassroots governance and its social and developmental infrastructure, with many towns grouped under the Local Government Areas.

Since its creation in 1976, Anambra State has been administered by eleven military and ten civilian governors, making a total of 21 governors. The State has had seven governors since the return to civil rule in 1999.

#### Past and Present Governors of Anambra State

S/N	Name of Governor	Period in Office	Sen. Dist. of Origin
<b>Before 1999</b>			
1	John Atom Kpera	March 1976 – July 1978	Military
2	Datti Abubakar	July 1978 – Oct. 1979	Military
3	Jim Nwobodo	Oct. 1979 – Oct. 1983	Civilian (Enugu)
4	Christian Onoh	Oct. 1983 – Dec. 1983	Civilian (Enugu)
5	Allison Madueke	Jan. 1984 – August 1985	Military
6	Samson Omeruah	August 1985 – Dec. 1987	Military
7	Robert Akonobi	Dec. 1987 – August 1990	Military
8	Herbert Eze	Aug. 1990 – August 1991	Military
9	Joseph Abulu	August 1991 – Jan. 1992	Military
10	Chukwuemeka Ezeife	Jan. 1992 – Nov. 1993	Anambra South
11	Dabo Aliyu	Nov. 1993 – Dec. 1993	Military
12	Mike Attah	Dec. 1993 – August 1996	Military
13	Rufai Garba	Aug. 1996 – Aug. 1998	Military
14	Emmanuel Ukaegbu	Aug. 1998 – May 1999	Military
<b>Since 1999</b>			
1	Chinwoke Mbadinuju	May 1999 – May 2003	Anambra South
2	Chris Ngige	May 2003 – March 2006	Anambra Central
3	Peter Obi	March 2006 – Nov. 2006	Anambra Central
4	Virginia Etiaba	Nov. 2006 – Feb. 2007	Anambra South
5	Peter Obi	Feb. 2007 – May 2007	Anambra Central
6	Andy Uba	May 2007 – June 2007	Anambra South
7	Peter Obi	June 2007 – March 2014	Anambra Central
8	Willie Obiano	March 2014 – March 2022	Anambra North
9	Charles Soludo	March 2022 – March 2026	Anambra South

Governors of Anambra State	
Military regime (1976-1979)	- John Atom Kpera - Datti Abubakar
Second Republic (1979-1983)	- Jim Nwobodo - Christian Onoh
Military regime (1984-1992)	- Allison Madueke - Samson Omeruah - Robert Akonobi - Herbert Eze - Joseph Abulu
Third Republic (1992-1993)	- Chukwuemeka Ezeife
Military regime (1993-1998)	- Dabo Aliyu - Mike Attah - Rufai Garba - Emmanuel Ukaegbu
Fourth Republic (Since 1999)	- Chinwoke Mbadinuju - Chris Ngige - Peter Obi - Virginia Etiaba - Peter Obi - Andy Uba - Peter Obi - Willie Obiano - Charles Soludo

The zoning and rotation of elective offices are major issues in Anambra politics, as they are across Nigeria. Over the years, politicians have ensured that the Governorship position rotates among the three Senatorial Districts in the State. As Table 1 above shows, Anambra State has had seven Governors over a period of 324 months (or 27 years). Within this period, Chris Ngige and Peter Obi from Anambra Central spent a period of 126 months (10.5 years) in office. In the same vein, Chinwoke Mbadinuju, Virginia Etiaba, Andy Uba, and Charles Soludo from Anambra South spent a period of 102 months (8.5 years) in office, while Willie Obiano from Anambra North spent a period of 96 months (8 years) in office. This analysis indicates a relative balance in office distribution among the senatorial districts in Anambra State, considering the political upheavals that dominated the first eight years of the fourth republic. The analysis equally demonstrates that politicians in the State have been intentional in ensuring that all parts of the state are represented.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Marcel Mbamalu, Battle for Anambra: Zoning, Politics and the Future, Punch, 14 April 2025, <https://punchng.com/battle-for-anambra-zoning-politics-and-the-future/>.

However, there has been a strong case against zoning, especially by some opposition politicians.<sup>15</sup> They argue that the zoning arrangement that exists in the State is essentially an APGA internal affair and should not be binding on other political parties. In addition, they claim that while selecting leaders, competence and capacity should be placed above parochial and provincial considerations, such as zoning. It appears that the above arguments did not resonate with the major political parties, as they all selected their candidates from the Anambra South Senatorial Zone in the spirit of the zoning. The political mobilization and contestation among the pro- and anti-zoning forces is expected to be a factor in the upcoming election.

Economically, the people of Anambra State are predominantly engaged in commerce, subsistence farming, and the provision of services. In urban areas like Nnewi, Onitsha, and Awka, trading is the dominant occupation, followed by services. A sizeable proportion of the population also engages in manufacturing activities, with the majority of the manufacturing firms located in Nnewi, Onitsha, and Awka. The State is a major center for commerce, industry, and transportation in the South-East geopolitical zone of Nigeria and beyond. In addition, the state has an abundant reserve of mineral resources such as natural gas, crude oil, bauxite, and ceramics.

Anambra State has the sixth-largest economy among Nigerian states, with an estimated GDP of 5.14 trillion naira in 2022.<sup>16</sup> The State experienced an average GDP growth rate of 22 percent in 2021 and 7 percent in 2022, with the contribution of the manufacturing sector increasing year-on-year. The manufacturing sector contributed 15 percent of the State's GDP in 2018, amounting to approximately 657.82 billion naira.<sup>17</sup>

This has grown by 62 percent in 2022. The manufacturing sector is estimated to have contributed 19 percent to the total GDP value of 5.1 trillion naira. The growth in the manufacturing sector is driven by activities in the food, beverages, tobacco, textile, apparel, footwear, and construction subsectors.

The service sector is a major pillar of Anambra State's economy, consistently contributing almost 60 percent of the State's GDP.<sup>18</sup> This contribution is driven by three major subsectors: trade (20 percent annually), telecom and information services (7 percent annually), and technical Services (6.5 percent annually). Like manufacturing and services, the agriculture sector has contributed an average of 20 percent to the State's GDP annually in the last five years, with the crop production subsector accounting for 95 percent of the agriculture sector's contribution to GDP.<sup>19</sup> Mining and Quarrying is the least contributor to the State's GDP, with less traction in the exploration of natural gas, crude oil, and metal ore mining.

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15 Chekwube Nzomiwu, Anambra 2025: Between zoning, capacity and competence, The Sun, 1 September 2024, [https://thesun.ng/anambra-2025-between-zoning-capacity-and-competence/#google\\_vignette](https://thesun.ng/anambra-2025-between-zoning-capacity-and-competence/#google_vignette).

16 Anambra State Government, Economic and Fiscal Update (EFU), Fiscal Strategy Paper (FSP) and Budget Policy Statement (BPS), 2023, [https://anambrastate.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/Approved-MTEF\\_-2024-2026.pdf](https://anambrastate.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/Approved-MTEF_-2024-2026.pdf).

17 Anambra State Government, Made in Anambra Export Strategy, 2023, [https://anambrastate.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/Anambra-Export-Strategy\\_-December-2023.pdf](https://anambrastate.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/Anambra-Export-Strategy_-December-2023.pdf).

18 Anambra State Government, Made in Anambra Export Strategy, 2023, [https://anambrastate.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/Anambra-Export-Strategy\\_-December-2023.pdf](https://anambrastate.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/Anambra-Export-Strategy_-December-2023.pdf).

19 Ibid

In addition to a strong productive base, Anambra State has an impressive fiscal governance record. The State ranked 3 out of 36 in the 2024 Fiscal Performance Ranking compiled by a civic organisation – BudgetT.<sup>20</sup> The State's Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) increased by 24.29 percent, from 29.13 billion naira in 2022 to 36.2 billion naira in 2023. Anambra State generated the second-highest Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) in the South-East, closely following Enugu State. Tax revenue contributed 67.76 percent to its IGR, while the remaining 32.24 percent was from non-tax revenue. However, it is important to note that Anambra State heavily depends on allocations from the Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC), as the latter contributed 78.65 percent to its recurrent revenue, while IGR contributed 21.35 percent in 2023.

Anambra State's total debt at the end of 2023 stood at 170.65 billion naira, a 37.39 percent increase from 124.21 billion naira in 2022. The State's debt burden has grown in the last six years, from 66.15 billion naira in 2018 to 170.65 billion naira in 2023. With a foreign debt-to-total debt ratio of 56.52 percent, the state ranks 19th in the debt sustainability ranking, 22nd most indebted state in the country, and 31st in terms of domestic borrowings in 2023. Overall, the State's total debt per capita is 25,376 naira, significantly lower than the national average debt per capita of 40,469 naira.

While the economy of Anambra State appears robust on paper, the socio-economic conditions of the people is deteriorating, as many residents of the state are plagued by poverty, unemployment, poor access to basic amenities, and insecurity. For instance, the National Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) report released by the NBS in 2022, which assessed poverty across four dimensions: health, education, living standards, and work and shocks, classified 32.1 per cent of Anambra State's population as living in multidimensional poverty.<sup>21</sup> Although the proportion of the population experiencing multidimensional poverty in Anambra State is lower than in three states in the South East region (Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo), the fact that nearly one-third of the state is multi-dimensionally poor is a basis for concern.

Records produced by the National Statistics Bureau indicate that Anambra State has one of the highest rates of unemployment in the country, with 44.2 per cent of its population unemployed as of the fourth quarter of 2020.<sup>22</sup> With regards to access to education, data from the United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) show that Anambra State has an out-of-school rate of 21 percent in primary, 13 percent in lower secondary, and 19 percent in upper secondary as of 2023.<sup>23</sup> The lowest rates were one percent in primary and lower secondary, and seven percent in upper secondary.

20 BudgetT, 2024 State of States Report, <https://stateofstates.budgetit.org/reports/details?year=2024>.

21 Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index (2022), <https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/NIGERIA%20MULTIDIMENSIONAL%20POVERTY%20INDEX%20SURVEY%20RESULTS%202022.pdf>.

22 NBS, Labor Force Statistics: Unemployment and Underemployment Report (Q4 2020), [https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/Q4\\_2020\\_Unemployment\\_Report.pdf](https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/Q4_2020_Unemployment_Report.pdf).

23 UNICEF, Nigeria Education Fact Sheets 2023, <https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/media/9211/file/Nigeria%20Education%20Fact%20Sheets.pdf>.

The socio-economic conditions of the people of Anambra State have been worsened by rising inflation, soaring cost of living, economic disruptions caused by “sit-at-home” orders, and persistent insecurity in the State. These factors affect economic activity, daily life, and the delivery of public services. The national inflation trends, driven by an increase in fuel prices,<sup>24</sup> poor management of the foreign exchange regime,<sup>25</sup> rising transportation costs, and increasing food prices, are straining household budgets across Nigeria, including Anambra State. In August 2024, the South East region, which includes Anambra State, recorded a food inflation rate of 53.48 percent, the highest in the country, which significantly reduces people's purchasing power.<sup>26</sup> High inflation, combined with low consumer spending, is a key economic challenge. Citizens are adopting survival strategies, such as reducing the number of meals per day, to cope with skyrocketing prices.

The weekly enforcement of the ‘sit-at-home’ order by separatists since 2021 has severely affected the economy of Anambra State, pushing the state towards economic paralysis. The measure forces the closure of businesses, markets, and banks, and suspends public transportation. A 2023 report by the Anambra State Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (ASCCIMA) estimated that the state loses over 10 billion naira weekly in economic productivity due to Sit-at-Home action.<sup>27</sup> The informal sector and daily wage earners are particularly hard-hit, suffering from income instability. The fear of violence and economic uncertainty created by the order has discouraged both local and foreign investment, stalling infrastructure projects and business confidence.

The security situation in Anambra State is severely deteriorating, marked by violence, kidnappings, and attacks by gunmen. The security environment is hostile to investment or everyday commerce, impeding the State's development. The pervasive insecurity has negatively impacted economic sectors. The agricultural sector has been affected by clashes between farmers and herders in some communities, leading to food scarcity and higher inflation. Persistent insecurity in Anambra State has disrupted community life in many places, causing a decline in social events and increased fear. This erodes the social trust and cooperation necessary for progress. The sit-at-home order and security concerns have severely hampered public service delivery. Schools operate on shortened weeks, leading to learning gaps, while hospitals and clinics run at reduced capacity as healthcare workers stay home for safety. The

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24 On 29 May 2023, in his inaugural speech, President Bola Tinubu announced the removal of the decade-long subsidy on petroleum products. Two months after the removal of the fuel subsidy, petrol prices rose by about 255 per cent (from 189 to 617 naira per litre), the highest in the history of the country. The removal of fuel subsidy produced a domino effect that triggered a steep rise in inflation, which has further perpetuated the widespread poverty in the country.

25 The effect of poor management of the foreign exchange regime on the citizens, in an overwhelmingly import-dependent economy, has been extremely deleterious. As the banks were unable to supply the dollars required to meet Nigeria's importation demands, importers turned to the black market, widening the gap between official and black market exchange rates. On 21 September 2023, the foreign exchange crisis in the country reached a new high with a dollar exchanging for over 1,000 naira at the black market compared to 760 naira on 14 June 2023 – a 32 per cent increase. The dollar to naira rate as of October 2025 is 1,471.04 naira to one dollar.

26 NBS, Consumer Price Index August 2024, <https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/download/1241554>.

27 Anambra State Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (ASCCIMA), Annual Economic Impact Report on Civil Disobedience in Southeast Nigeria, Awka: ASCCIMA, 2023.

worsening conditions have triggered growing public discontent. There have been protests over increased taxation and the rising cost of basic services like electricity and transportation. Some analysts believe this reflects the government's failure to improve security, education, agriculture, and healthcare, suggesting that the populace is losing faith in the government's ability to address their problems.<sup>28</sup>

As the foregoing demonstrates, government policies and insecurity have tended to exacerbate the deplorable economic conditions of many Nigerians, pushing millions of citizens into extreme poverty and hardship. It is well known that economic adversity has a particularly significant effect on the quality of elections, especially regarding poor voter turnout,<sup>29</sup> vote buying,<sup>30</sup> and electoral violence. With the current economic realities in Nigeria, these factors – poor turnout, vote buying, and electoral violence – will likely play a defining role in the 2025 Anambra State governorship election.

The preceding analysis presented the broad historical, geographical, political, and socio-economic context of the 2025 governorship election in Anambra State. It highlights the current socio-economic condition of the people of Anambra State and the challenges faced by the people of the State. Overall, the interaction of these contextual issues and political developments in the State, such as the pattern of elite configuration, the intensity of political contestation, and the nature of political mobilization, will shape the conduct and outcome of the forthcoming governorship election in the State.

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28 Chikaodi Chukwuleta, *Fall of Soludo's Anambra: A Descent into Uncertain Future*, The Gazelle News, 22 September 2025, <https://www.thegazellenews.com/fall-of-soludos-anambra-a-descent-into-uncertain-future/>.

29 Steven J. Rosenstone, *Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout*, *American Journal of Political Science*, 26(1): 1982, pp. 25-46.

30 Peter Sandholt Jensen & Mogens K. Justesen, *Poverty and Vote Buying: Survey-based Evidence from Africa*, *Electoral Studies*, 33: 2014, pp. 220-232.

## Factors that will Determine the Race

Drawing from the foregoing background and current political developments in Anambra State, five major issues can be identified as the defining factors in the forthcoming governorship election. These issues include:

- a. The incumbency factor
- b. The drive to strengthen APGA's dominance
- c. The influence of Peter Obi in Anambra politics
- d. The declining public trust in INEC and the electoral process
- e. The security situation in Anambra State

### I. The incumbency factor

The power of incumbency is a defining factor in Nigerian politics. The incumbency factor refers to the advantages candidates have in an election because they are the current officeholders.<sup>31</sup> This phenomenon has been widely observed in political systems across the world, though its influence is subject to specific political contexts. In Nigeria, when incumbent governors run for reelection, they often win over 80 percent of the time, typically with more than 60 percent of the vote.<sup>32</sup> For instance, in 2023, 13 incumbent state governors sought reelection, and all but one, Governor Bello Matawalle of Zamfara State, were reelected, representing 92.31 percent of the incumbent candidates. Incumbent candidates, similarly, dominated the governorship elections conducted between 2019 and 2023. Out of the 24 incumbent state governors who stood for reelection in that period, 20 were reelected, representing 83.33 percent of the incumbent candidates.

Generally, several resources and behaviours contribute to the electoral success of incumbents.<sup>33</sup> Firstly, the incumbents, by virtue of having held office, are usually more familiar to the public than their challengers. This can significantly influence voters who rely on name recognition when casting their ballots. Nigerian elections are generally “low information races”<sup>34</sup> in which voters are usually not well informed about the issues or the candidates, so basic name recognition, in which incumbents typically have the advantage, goes a long way in enhancing prospects of electoral victory. Secondly, the incumbents can leverage their official positions to boost their public profile and communicate with constituents. They can use official communications channels, such as print and broadcast media, and benefit from

31 James E. Campbell, *The Return of the Incumbents: The Nature of the Incumbency Advantage*, *Western Political Quarterly*, 36(3): 1983, pp. 434-444.

32 Olly Owen and Zainab Usman, *Incumbency and Opportunity: Forecasting Trends in Nigeria's 2015 Elections*, QEHL Working Paper Series (Working paper No. 205), 2015, [https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/pdf\\_docs/qehwps205.pdf](https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/pdf_docs/qehwps205.pdf).

33 Keith Krehbiel and John R. Wright, *The Incumbency Effect in Congressional Elections: A Test of Two Explanations*, *American Journal of Political Science*, 27(1): 1983, pp. 140-157.

34 R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall, and Ines Levin, *Low Information Voting: Evidence from Instant-Runoff Elections*, *American Politics Research*, 46(6): 2018, pp. 1012-1038.

media coverage related to their office. Thirdly, the incumbents typically have more extensive fundraising networks and easier access to campaign finance than challengers. It is more likely for the incumbents to get funding because they are proven winners. Funders are more likely to support someone whom they think is going to be elected to office than someone who they believe will probably lose. Furthermore, the ability to provide services to constituents and influence policy-making helps incumbents build goodwill and claim credit for desirable outcomes. This can lead voters to re-elect them based on past performance. Lastly, voters may perceive incumbents as having valuable experience in leadership. Being seen as a “known quantity” can reassure voters, who may view challengers as a riskier choice.

The power of incumbency encompasses both the ability to mobilize voters and to manipulate the electoral environment (and sometimes also to influence administrative procedures and outcomes). The abuse of the power of incumbency is well attested to in Nigeria, both by political analysis and popular discourse.<sup>35</sup> Examples range from the appropriation, misuse or preferential disposal of state assets (public finances, transport, air time on state-owned broadcasters) to the benefit of the incumbent, to the use of state power to deter or hamper opponents, such as orchestrating security agents to refuse permits for opposition rallies, or to create a security climate which would deter opposition turnout. They also encompass ploys which both fulfil roles expected of an incumbent government and also asymmetrically influence the electoral playing field (such as when a state governor who is seeking reelection houses and supports electoral officials, a common practice when their own allowances are late or not paid in full).

While the benefits of being an incumbent are many, there are also circumstances the incumbency factor can impede a candidate's prospects of reelection.<sup>36</sup> Firstly, deteriorating socio-economic conditions are most times blamed on the current officeholder. This may lead to general public discontent and can negatively affect an incumbent's chances of reelection. Secondly, if an incumbent's performance in office is seen as unconvincing, opponents can use that track record to argue against their reelection. Thirdly, controversial decisions or policies initiated and implemented by an incumbent can alienate voters and create political opponents, who may actively work against the incumbent.

The pros and cons of incumbency discussed above are relevant for understanding the incumbency factor and political succession in Anambra State, particularly in the present dispensation. Although there was a high turnover of incumbent candidates in the Anambra State governorship elections between 1999 and 2007, the incumbent candidates have established their dominance since 2010. From 2010 to date, no incumbent governor has lost the governorship election in Anambra State, reflecting their ability to exploit the incumbency advantages. We believe that the incumbency factor will be critical in determining the outcome of the 2025 Anambra State governorship election.

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35 Ndubuisi Francis, Jinadu: Abuse of Incumbency Power, Highest Form of Corruption, This Day, 11 December 2024, <https://www.thisdaylive.com/2024/12/11/jinadu-abuse-of-incumbency-power-highest-form-of-corruption-2/>.

36 Bobbie Macdonald, Incumbency Disadvantages in African Politics? Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Zambian Elections," 2014, [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN\\_ID2428575\\_code2121721.pdf?abstractid=2325674&mirid=1](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2428575_code2121721.pdf?abstractid=2325674&mirid=1).

## 2. APGA's Dominance

Since gaining power in Anambra State in 2006, the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) has held onto the governorship position in the State by winning all the governorship elections since 2010. APGA, as Anambra's ruling party for almost two decades, is a well-oiled political machine. The party has maintained a long-standing dominance in Anambra State, largely based on its appeal to Igbo ethnic identity and its control of the governorship since 2006. However, APGA's position is increasingly contested by internal and external challenges. With the November 2025 gubernatorial election approaching, its continued dominance will be tested.

APGA's strength rests on four elements. The first is the party's historical control of the State. APGA has governed Anambra State for nearly two decades and currently controls the state government and all its structures, including the governor's office and chairpersons of all the local government areas. Through its extensive mobilization efforts, the party has permeated the nooks and crannies of the State and reached the fabric of society. The incumbent governor, Chukwuma Soludo, is leveraging the party's wide reach. Recently, he established a 489-member Campaign Council with a mandate to take the party and its candidate to all villages and communities in the State. The Council has also enlisted the support of groups such as the Association of Non-indigenes in Anambra State. Secondly, APGA has a symbolic appeal in Anambra State. The party's 'Onye aghana nwanne ya' (be your brother's keeper) mantra and its ties to the ex-Biafran leader, Dim Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, give it a strong emotional connection with voters. Thirdly, APGA has enjoyed a longstanding incumbency advantage, which has enhanced the appeal of the party and ensured that it attracts good candidates. Lastly, APGA's reputation and dominance are enhanced by its recent victories. Despite opposition, APGA continues to demonstrate its electoral strength by winning recent by-elections, such as the Anambra South Senatorial by-election in August 2025.

APGA's dominance in Anambra State has been enhanced by the decline of its main challenger, the People's Democratic Party (PDP). The PDP that dominated Anambra politics in the early years of the Fourth Republic has almost gone extinct in the State, easing any strong opposition to APGA. Currently, the PDP has no leadership in the state, due to a longstanding leadership tussle awaiting court judgment. The once influential party in the state cannot convene its stakeholders in the state, as they are fast disappearing into other political parties. The decline of the PDP has been accompanied by a decline in the influence of erstwhile political godfathers and political entrepreneurs in the State. For instance, Chris Uba, once the undisputed kingmaker of Anambra politics, has seen his influence wane in recent years. While his past ability to shape elections was legendary, Uba now faces a fragmented PDP and a political base that has eroded over time. The lingering memory of past controversies continues to affect his public perception. The PDP's decline in Anambra State has been compounded by the defection of many of its strong members to other parties, particularly the APC.

Despite clear evidence of APGA's dominance in Anambra State, the party is facing increasing threats to its dominance. In the first place, APGA has been plagued by a protracted internal crisis and an enduring leadership crisis with multiple factions claiming to be the authentic national leadership of the party. This has led to several court cases and infighting that have sown disaffection and instability within the party. Furthermore, there is growing discontent with the current regime. Governor Soludo's administration has faced stern criticism over its governance approach and the way it is handling issues such as insecurity, alleged over-taxation, and failed promises to transform the state's infrastructure. These have alienated key voting blocs, including traders, civil servants, and the elite.

In addition, APGA is facing intense electoral challenges from the opposition. The perception of APGA's weakened state has energized opposition parties like the All Progressives Congress (APC), the Labour Party (LP), the Young Progressives Party (YPP), and the African Democratic Congress (ADC), to intensify their mobilization against the party. The LP's growing popularity, partly driven by the performance of its presidential candidate, Peter Obi, in the 2023 elections, poses a threat to APGA's traditional support base.

Similarly, the APC is actively mobilizing and campaigning to unseat APGA. The APC, being the ruling party at the centre, is leveraging the desire of many in the State to be connected to mainstream national politics. From an obscure political platform that has failed to make any significant impact in the State, the APC is becoming a popular destination for disgruntled politicians in the State, especially those leaving the PDP. This is gradually widening the acceptance of the APC in the State. In the 2023 elections, the APC failed to secure any seat in Anambra State. But what they could not win in the polls, they are now getting through defections. Since 2023, the APC has attracted big names such as Late Senator Ifeanyi Ubah and Senator Uche Ekwunife. While the APC parades a roster of defecting political heavyweights, many political observers argue that the party must work hard to convert its growing acceptance into actual votes. As they say in the street, "names don't win elections". The APC will face an uphill battle in Anambra State, where it has historically struggled to win the acceptance of a majority of voters.

Overall, APGA remains the dominant political force in Anambra, but its hold on power is less secure than in the past. The 2025 gubernatorial election is shaping up to be a critical test of APGA's continued dominance. For APGA to retain power, it must overcome its internal factional disputes and address the public's concerns regarding governance and security. A strong, unified opposition candidate could exploit APGA's internal weaknesses and public discontent, making the election more competitive than in previous years.

### **3. The Obi Factor in Anambra Politics**

Peter Obi served as the governor of Anambra State between 2006 and 2014. His rise to power was a tortuous one. He endured a long-drawn-out legal tussle that lasted for nearly three years before taking hold of his electoral mandate. As a Governor, he survived an impeachment following a court intervention, and an illegal election that would have

terminated his Governorship midway was overturned in his favour by the court. In the eight years he spent as Governor of Anambra State, Obi earned a reputation as an austere Governor committed to fiscal prudence, administrative efficiency, economic productivity, and community development. His supporters see him as the one who laid the foundation for the responsible fiscal governance that engineered prosperity and development in Anambra State. Obi's performance in office has become a gauge to measure the abilities and performance of the incumbent governors in Anambra State.

From a respected former governor of Anambra State, Obi launched himself as a national political figure. The rise of Peter Obi in the campaign for the 2023 presidential election was a major shake-up in Nigeria's politics, hitherto dominated by two major parties since the end of military rule in 1999. Against the backdrop of the disillusionment caused by the failure of the PDP and APC regimes, Peter Obi campaigned with the message of hope - that it is possible to rejuvenate Nigeria through frugal economic management, pointing to his experience as the governor of Anambra State. For him, the key to addressing Nigeria's socio-economic and security challenges is simply to transform the country from a consumption-driven to a production-driven economy. Obi's message, together with his frugal lifestyle despite being a wealthy businessman as well as his track record as a competent administrator who is not mired in corruption scandals during his tenure as the governor of Anambra state, endeared him to many.

When Peter Obi resigned from the PDP and joined the Labour Party (LP) based on the claims that PDP leaders were attempting to manipulate the party primaries, he moved with his supporters to the Party. The LP, which identifies itself with "social democracy" and opposes "neoliberalism" upheld by both the mainstream parties, worked hard to incorporate within its manifesto several key demands of the Nigerian labour movement. With the presence of Obi and the support of many young people and the working class, the LP emerged as a "third force" in Nigerian politics.

During the 2023 general election, Obi amassed 6.1 million votes, but trailed behind Bola Tinubu with 8.7 million votes and Atiku Abubakar with 6.9 million votes. In the assessment of many analysts, Obi's performance is nothing but decent considering that he and his party are relatively new entrants in the presidential race. The performance of the Labour Party in the 2023 general election is even more astounding. The party won the governorship election in Abia State, clinched six senatorial seats and 34 seats in the House of Representatives, as well as several seats in the State Houses of Assembly. A substantial number of seats won by the LP in the national and state legislatures were from Anambra State – 2 out of the 3 Senate seats, 6 out of the 11 House of Representatives seats, and 7 out of 30 State House of Assembly seats (detailed result of the national and state legislative election in Anambra State during the 2023 general election is presented in the appendix).

Ahead of the 2025 Anambra State governorship election, the key question in the minds of many is whether, and to what extent, Obi's popularity and his platform would shape the

forthcoming governorship election in the State. In fact, some observers see the Anambra State governorship election as a litmus test of Obi's popularity ahead of the 2027 general election. Obi's supporters believe that he has sufficient influence in Anambra State to wrestle power from the incumbent governor and the ruling party. Yet, current developments in the State point to the contrary. It is apparent that the Obi factor in Anambra politics might not be as politically potent as some assume.

Obi's political strength lies in his charisma and ideology. His public persona is built around his ideology of fiscal prudence, anti-corruption stance, a shift from consumption to production, emphasis on human capital, and support for private-sector-driven growth. Based on his ideology, Obi connects with young voters. During the 2023 presidential election, Obi's campaign energized millions of young Nigerians who felt disillusioned with the established political parties. His volunteer-led "Obidient Movement" used social media and grassroots rallies to mobilize support, projecting an image of a new political force driven by the youth. Similarly, Obi makes a populist appeal, mobilizing voters frustrated with the status quo. His message of accountability and reform resonated with those tired of corrupt and wasteful governance. Furthermore, Obi has built an image of resilience in the face of political challenges. His supporters see him as a dogged fighter who, against odds, successfully reclaimed his gubernatorial mandate multiple times through the courts, an action that showcased his persistence.

Though Obi is strong in charisma and ideology, his capacity to organize politically is in doubt. His critics see him as a serial defector who finds it hard to maintain a stable political platform and to hold a party together in the face of fissiparous tendencies. Presently, Obi is not strongly rooted in any political party in Anambra State, and this is, perhaps, the most important factor that could erode his potential influence in the 2025 gubernatorial election.

After leaving office as the Governor in 2014, Obi entered into a disagreement with his successor, Willie Obiano. That rift eventually led to his resignation from APGA. Considering that Obi's governorship and his doggedness provided the foundation for APGA's prominence and predominance in Anambra politics, Obi's exit from the party was a major loss. His defection to the PDP, at a time his looming image and father figure was badly needed in APGA, was considered a betrayal by some of his followers. Obi's romance with the PDP during the 2015 presidential campaign and unhidden support for Goodluck Jonathan riled many of his supporters, who questioned his morality and ideological conviction in politics. Some die-hard members of APGA alleged that he reneged on the promises he made to the late Dim Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu that he would never abandon APGA. Obi's move from the PDP to LP, and his unsettled existence in the Labour Party, after internal crisis ripped the LP apart, are a source of uncertainty and worry to his supporters.


Previous attempts by Obi to influence the Anambra State governorship elections in 2017 and 2021 did not yield significant results, as APGA continued to maintain its hold on the State. One is therefore in doubt whether Obi's influence would sway the race in 2025. To

undercut Obi's influence, the incumbent governor, Chukwuma Soludo, appears to be allying with President Bola Tinubu and his party, the APC. During a recent visit to Anambra State, President Bola Tinubu underscored his desire for political bridge-building and consummation of bipartisan strategies ahead of the 2027 general election. The President used his visit to endorse Governor Soludo's second term, and in return, he got a rousing adoption by APGA.<sup>37</sup> Soludo's supporters have defended his romance with President Tinubu, insisting that it is a continuation of the pattern established by Peter Obi, where APGA aligns with the president and the ruling political party at the centre. Soludo's alliance with President Tinubu is a continuation of his opposition to Peter Obi's presidential ambition during the 2023 general election.<sup>38</sup>

#### 4. Trust in INEC and the Electoral Process

Trust in INEC and the electoral process has declined consistently since the 2015 general election. Anecdotal evidence and surveys indicate a steady loss of confidence by the electorate in the past two general election cycles - 2019 and 2023.

#### Trust in the Electoral Commission 2000 - 2022



Source: Afrobarometer Survey February 2023<sup>39</sup>


In Anambra State, a recent public sentiment survey showed a fragile confidence in electoral administration in the State. Across the State, the share of respondents who said they do not trust INEC to conduct a credible election clustered around 70 percent. Specifically, respondents reported no trust at all at 31.61 percent, very little trust at 39.92 percent, some trust at 13.19 percent, and a great deal of trust at 15.28 percent. Respondents in the survey attributed their views primarily to the 2023 general election experience, with 68.70 percent

37 Leo Sobechi, Lawrence Njoku, and Chuks Collins, Anambra, APGA, Obi's Kinsmen Endorse Tinubu for Second Term, Guardian, 9 May 2025, [https://guardian.ng/news/anambra-apga-obi-kinsmen-endorse-tinubu-for-second-term/#google\\_vignette](https://guardian.ng/news/anambra-apga-obi-kinsmen-endorse-tinubu-for-second-term/#google_vignette).


38 Soludo's open letter titled: History Beckons, I won't be silent, which was authored in November 2022, was one thing that guided many in gauging the thinking of the governor.

39 <https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/R9-News-release-Nigerians-want-competitive-elections-but-dont-trust-INEC-Afrobarometer-2feb23.pdf>.

indicating that their trust levels were shaped by that cycle, followed by 17.44 percent citing the last Anambra gubernatorial election, and 13.85 percent citing elections conducted in other states.<sup>40</sup>



Source: KDI Survey 2025



Source: KDI Survey 2025


40 KDI, The Early Warning: Assessing Pre-election Security Risk ahead of the 2025 Anambra Off-cycle Governorship Election, Abuja: Kimpact Development Initiative, 2025.

The 2023 general election appears to have caused great damage to confidence in INEC and the electoral process in Nigeria. Election observers underscored the damaging effects of the election when they maintained that “the 2023 general election did not ensure a well-run, transparent, and inclusive democratic process as assured by INEC,” and “that public confidence and trust in INEC were severely damaged during the elections.”<sup>41</sup> The Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room, in particular, noted that “public confidence in [INEC’s] capacity to run elections is gravely shaken, and it would require extraordinary efforts for trust to be re-established.”<sup>42</sup> This image casts a dark shadow around the 2025 Anambra State governorship election, as the spectre of election failure looms.

In general, the factors that drive trust deficit in INEC and the electoral process include political factors, such as the personal experience of the electorate with elections, as well as the electorate’s views of the general political situation, their situation, and the stability of the political system. The trust deficit in INEC and the electoral process is also motivated by the behaviour and characteristics of the commission, including perceived integrity, transparency, competence, and stability of the commission. Furthermore, the trust deficit in INEC and the electoral process is shaped by a perception of the quality of the services offered by the commission and the ease with which they can be accessed. Lastly, trust in INEC and the electoral process depends on the existence of policy measures and institutional settings to hold election officials accountable - trust is stronger in a well-established institutional environment.

The trust deficit in INEC and the election process has particularly affected voter turnout in Nigeria. Generally, voter turnout has steadily declined in Nigeria since the 2003 presidential election.

### Voter Turnout in Nigeria’s Presidential Elections 1999-2023



Source: Acheampong 2023<sup>43</sup>

41 European Union Election Observation Mission – Nigeria 2023 General Elections Final Report, <https://eusdgn.org/european-union-election-observation-mission-nigeria-2023-general-election-final-report/>.

42 Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room, Report on Nigeria’s 2023 General Elections, <https://situationroomng.org/wp-content/uploads/formidable/6/Situation-Room-Report-on-Nigerias-2023-General-Election.pdf>.

43 Acheampong, M. Overpromising and Underdelivering? Digital Technology in Nigeria’s 2023 Presidential Elections. (GIGA Focus Afrika, 2). Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) - Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien, Institut für Afrika-Studien, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.57671/gfaf-23022>.

In the last four elections, for instance, turnout continuously declined from 54 percent in 2011 to 44 percent in 2015 and then down to 35 percent in 2019. The 2023 General Election not only produced an abysmal 27 percent turnout but also the lowest since the inception of the country's Fourth Republic in 1999.

Among Nigerian States, Anambra State stands out with a history of low voter turnout in its Governorship Election, recording 16.33 percent in 2010, 24.98 percent in 2013, 21.74 percent in 2017, and 10.27 percent in 2021.

Election observers and analysts maintain that operational lapses by INEC, low confidence in election results announced by the Commission, and fear of insecurity are the main reasons that discourage the electorate in the State from voting.<sup>44</sup> When asked to recall top difficulties experienced in the last election in a recent survey, respondents identified operational lapses such as malfunctioning of BVAS (33.42 percent of the respondents), late arrival of electoral officials and materials (29.25 percent of the respondents), delays in attending to voters (16.85 percent of the respondents), incompetence of election officials (6.07 percent of the respondents), and violence, including threats and intimidation (5.72 percent of the respondents).<sup>45</sup> These operational lapses during elections sit alongside widespread reports of operational bottlenecks in the Continuous Voter Registration (CVR), including late arrival of officials, shortage of registration materials, delays in the registration process, malfunctioning of registration devices, overcrowding of registration centres, and allegations of extortion by officials.<sup>46</sup> These experiences reinforce the perception of INEC as an incompetent institution, fuelling citizens' frustration with the Commission and the electoral process, escalating tension at electoral sites, stirring disputes over the credibility of election results, and discouraging voter turnout.



44 Kabir Yusuf and Ebuka Onyeji, Analysis: Anambra 2021 Governorship Election Records 'Historic Low' Voter Turnout...Only 10 percent of the Registered Voters in the State Voted during the 2021 Governorship Election, Premium Times, 10 November 2021, <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/494588-analysis-anambra-2021-governorship-election-records-historic-low-voter-turnout.html?tztc=1>.

45 KDI, The Early Warning: Assessing Pre-election Security Risk ahead of the 2025 Anambra Off-cycle Governorship Election, Abuja: Kimpact Development Initiative, 2025.

46 See CDD, Observation Report: Anambra State Continuous Voter Registration Exercise 08 - 20 July 2025, Abuja: Centre for Democracy and Development, 2025.




Ahead of the 2025 Anambra State governorship election, extraordinary efforts are required to re-establish trust. In this regard, INEC must demonstrate that it has drawn lessons from the post-election review of the 2021 governorship election and the 2023 general election by improving the voting experience during the forthcoming election. In particular, the Commission must ensure that delays to the commencement of voting arising from the late arrival of election materials and officials are addressed. In addition, the Commission must work with security agencies to identify and address sources of threats to voters, election officials, and other election workers. INEC must focus more attention on the conduct of its officials and staff, including the National and Resident Electoral Commissioners, to identify and address any form of misconduct. The Commission must resist political interference in election management, increase oversight of election administration, tackle vote buying, and improve its strategic communication during elections. On its part, the Bola Tinubu administration should utilize the opportunity provided by the Anambra State Governorship Election to demonstrate its interest and commitment to addressing the persistent challenges with the electoral process in Nigeria by not meddling in the electoral process but adequately supporting all the agencies involved in the process.

## 5. Precarious Security Environment

The 2021 Anambra State governorship election was conducted under an agitated security environment, fuelled by the violence arising from the lingering separatist agitation by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and attacks by unidentified armed groups popularly

referred to as unknown gunmen. One of Situation Room partners, Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI), reported 62 incidents of politically related violence that culminated in the death of over 50 people in Anambra State between January and August 2021.<sup>47</sup> The 2021 election was marked by attacks on INEC facilities and security formations, as well as assassinations and cases of high-profile kidnapping, including that of the candidate of a political party. Heightened insecurity during the 2021 governorship election led to the postponement of the election in Ihiala local government area following INEC's inability to mobilize fully for the election.

It appears that the 2025 Anambra State governorship election will suffer a hangover of the 2021 violence, as the authorities have failed to curb the spate of violence in the State. Data from another Situation Room partner, CLEEN Foundation, show that over 200 people have been killed in politically motivated violence since 2022, with 46 deaths occurring in Ihiala local government area.<sup>48</sup> Included in these figures are 14 political assassinations, including that of a party leader in Nnewi North local government area, and multiple cult-related killings during party primaries in Awka South and Onitsha North local government areas. Attacks on INEC facilities and security formations have continued to occur. CLEEN Foundation reported nine attacks on INEC facilities in Aguata, Idemili North, and Anambra East local government areas. There have also been several attacks on police stations and military checkpoints.<sup>49</sup>



Source: CLEEN Foundation

47 <https://kimpact.org.ng/blog/post/10082?f=Electoral%20Security#gsc.tab=0>.

48 CLEEN Foundation, Anambra 2025 Governorship Election Security Threat Assessment, Abuja: CLEEN Foundation, 2025, [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1orDm\\_4n2kd0DEGJ7d0lgNtNkGbM7j-D2/view?pli=1](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1orDm_4n2kd0DEGJ7d0lgNtNkGbM7j-D2/view?pli=1).

49 Ibid.

## High Risk Local Govt Areas

- Ihiala
- Ogbaru
- Nnewi South
- Orumba North
- Onitsha North



ANAMBRA  
ELECTION 2025

ELECTION  
SECURITY  
THREAT  
ASSESSMENT



Source: CLEEN Foundation



Source: CLEEN Foundation

The government's response to the security situation in Anambra State has been multi-pronged, combining strategies such as the introduction of legislation, adoption of operational measures, and community engagement. In the first place, the state government launched a security initiative known as 'Udo Ga-Achi' (peace shall prevail) on 18 January 2025. The initiative involves the mobilization of 2,000 personnel from various security agencies, including the police, the Nigerian Army, the Navy, the Department of State Services (DSS), and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) for the operation. The formal security personnel are supported by local vigilante groups, known as "Agunechemba", and

the procurement of 200 vehicles to patrol communities across the state, especially in Awka, Nnewi, Onitsha, and their environs. The core strategy of the “Udo Ga-Achi” initiative includes criminal stronghold clearance involving a coordinated joint task force that aims at destroying the numerous criminal camps in forests across the state, and an anti-touting unit, which is a dedicated unit established to combat the activities of touts, creating a more orderly and secure environment for residents and businesses.

The state government followed up the “Udo Ga-Achi” initiative with the enactment of the Anambra State Homeland Security Law 2025. The law provides a legal framework for citizen participation in public security, as well as a legal backing to the Agunchemba, a structured state security outfit designed to complement and support existing law enforcement agencies in preventing crime and detecting criminal activities. Other key elements of the Anambra Homeland Security Law 2025 include the integration of technology in security provisioning through the deployment of modern security tools and gadgets, such as command-and-control platforms, tracking systems, and AI-powered surveillance cameras, the establishment of a State Call Centre with toll-free access for streamlined reporting and assistance, mobilization of community support through the introduction of monthly security support grants to communities to enhance local safety initiatives, and the introduction of monthly bonus of 10 million naira for Divisional Police Offices that achieve zero violent crime records.

Among other things, the law criminalises native doctors who prepare protective charms for kidnappers, or get-rich-quick charms, also known as “Oke lte”. The law provides that any property found to have been used for harbouring kidnap suspects or housing kidnappers without the owner revealing the same to security agencies would be forfeited to the state government and demolished. Some provisions of the law hold community leaders, traditional rulers, landlords, and neighbours to account if they failed to disclose to the government or security agencies the identity of people who live within their vicinity, who are involved in criminal acts. Hotels and other hospitality facilities are also advised to send the identity of guests to the state government as a compulsory daily routine.

The government claims that the implementation of the security initiatives has significantly improved the security situation in Anambra State, maintaining that the outcome of the initiatives is marked by the reclamation of communities and the dismantling of criminals’ camps and hideouts, especially in Ihiala, Nnewi South, Orumba South, and Ogbaru local government areas;<sup>50</sup> increased social and economic activities across the state, arrest of high-profile criminals,<sup>51</sup> and efforts toward sustained stability.<sup>52</sup>

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50 The government claims that sustained efforts by a joint task force and the state’s security network have led to the destruction of over 60 criminal hideouts in forests, significantly curtailing the activities of non-state actors.

51 They include some popular native doctors in the state known to be involved in criminal activities, such as Chidozie Nwangwu, popularly known as Akwa Okuko Tiwara Aki; Eke Hit, a native doctor from Okija in Ihiala Local Government Area, and Onyebuchi, popularly known as Onye Eze Jesus.

52 Dozie Emmanuel, Soludo and Security Challenges in Anambra State, *Business Day*, 17 June 2025, <https://businessday.ng/life/article/soludo-and-security-challenges-in-anambra-state/>.

However, extrajudicial killings, abuse of power,<sup>53</sup> extortion,<sup>54</sup> and failure to swiftly deal with violent crimes have dampened public confidence in the ability of the security initiative to deliver the desired results. Critics, such as politician Valentine Ozigbo, have expressed concerns over the security initiative, arguing that the Homeland Security Law is prone to abuse, could conflict with the Nigerian Constitution, infringes on citizens' rights, and imposes impractical obligations on the people.<sup>55</sup> Other critics claim that the security initiative has been ineffective, insisting that criminal activities persist, if not on the rise, particularly in the Ihiala and Ogbaru local government areas, and that the authorities are at a loss on how to comprehensively deal with the situation. Lastly, some critics question the timing and motive of the security initiative, suggesting it was belated and potentially politically motivated ahead of the 2025 governorship election.<sup>56</sup>

The contrasting perspectives on the security situation in Anambra State highlight the complexity of the security environment and the challenges of achieving a peaceful election in the state. Overall, insecurity and risk of violence are potential impediments to the orderly conduct of the 2025 Anambra State governorship election. The precarious security environment in the State has the potential to adversely affect voter turnout and provide an opportunity for suppression of votes.

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53 In August 2025, the government dismissed eight 'Agunchemba' operatives for brutally assaulting a female National Youth Service Corps member; highlighting the risk of misconduct by the security force.

54 In January 2025, the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) raised concerns about the conduct of security agencies manning checkpoints, citing extortion and hardship caused the road users. The Association urged the authorities to address the issue.

55 Soludo's Special Security Operation in Anambra: Matters Arising, Guardian, 7 February 2025, <https://guardian.ng/opinion/editorial/soludos-special-security-operation-in-anambra-matters-arising/>.

56 Ikenna Obianeri, By-elections: Soludo under Fire for Deploying Security Team, Punch, 20 August 2025, <https://punchng.com/by-elections-soludo-under-fire-for-deploying-security-team/#:~:text=But%20the%20governorship%20candidate%20of,Saturday%2C%20August%2016%2C%202025.>

## INEC's Preparations

Preparations for the 2025 Anambra State governorship election commenced in October 2024 following the release of the Timetable and Schedule of Activities for the election by INEC. In the Timetable and Schedule of Activities for the election, INEC indicated that the Anambra State governorship election would be held on 8 November 2025, in line with Section 28(1) of the Electoral Act 2022, which requires the commission to issue the notice for elections not later than 360 days before the date of the election, and Sections 178(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 which mandates the Commission to conduct elections not earlier than 150 days and not later than 30 days before the expiration of the term of the last holder of the office. The tenure of the incumbent Governor of Anambra State will end on 16 March 2026. The Timetable and Schedule of Activities for the election further indicated that the statutory Notice of Election will be published on 21 November 2024, in fulfilment of the requirement of Section 28(1) of the Electoral Act 2022, which mandates the Commission to publish the Notice of Election not later than 360 days before the date fixed for the elections. Party primaries were scheduled to be held from 20 March to 10 April 2025, while the online portal for the submission of nomination forms (EC9 and EC9B) by political parties was scheduled to open at 9.00 am on 18 April 2025 and close at 6.00 pm on 12 May 2025. The final list of candidates was scheduled to be published on 9 June 2025, while the campaign by political parties was scheduled to commence on 11 June 2025 and end at midnight on 6 November 2025. INEC has diligently followed these timelines and implemented the various electoral activities without any major hitches.

The release of the Timetable and Schedule of Activities for the Anambra State governorship election by INEC provided the framework for the commencement of election preparations by various political parties. For instance, in March 2025, the All Progressives Party (APC) released a Schedule of Activities and Timetable for the Anambra State governorship election, which indicated that the party would conduct its primary election on 5 April 2025. According to the Schedule, the sale of nomination forms was planned to open on 10 February and close on 25 February 2025.

As is now the practice, the various political parties set exorbitant amounts as the cost of their Expression of Interest and Nomination Forms. For instance, the APC fixed the highest amount of 50 million naira for the Expression of Interest and Nomination Form.<sup>57</sup> The APC was followed by the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which pegged the cost of the forms at 40 million naira,<sup>58</sup> while the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) set the cost

57 Adebayo Folorunsho-Francis, APC Sets N50m for Anambra Gov Forms, Punch, 4 February 2025 <https://punchng.com/apc-sets-n50m-for-anambra-gov-forms/>.

58 Emmanuel Ndukuba, Anambra PDP guber aspirants to pay N40m nomination forms, Business Day, 26 February 2025, <https://businessday.ng/politics/article/anambra-pdp-guber-aspirants-to-pay-n40m-nomination-forms/>.

of its Expression of Interest and Nomination Forms at 30 million naira.<sup>59</sup> The high cost of nomination forms has been identified as a major disincentive to inclusive electoral process. As a redress, some political parties have either awarded a fee waiver or reduced fees to vulnerable groups, including women, youths, and people with disability.

Although the primaries of most political parties were generally hitch-free, the exercise was associated with the intrigues, controversies, and political manoeuvres that often characterize party politics in Nigeria. In the APC primaries, for example, Prince Nicholas Ukachukwu emerged as the governorship candidate following a tense and chaotic primary.<sup>60</sup> The result released by the organizers of the primary indicates that Ukachukwu clinched the party's ticket with 1,455 votes, defeating his closest challenger, Valentine Ozigbo, who secured 67 votes.

However, the exercise was reportedly marred by confusion and controversy, with accreditation still ongoing as late as 7.00 pm, long after the 9.00 am scheduled for commencement of the exercise. Delegates were reportedly being accredited at undisclosed hotels around Awka, while many party members and supporters waited at the official venue, the Dora Akunyili Women Development Centre.<sup>61</sup> The exercise was dented by violence as suspected thugs allegedly hired by one of the aspirants attacked delegates, injuring several people in the presence of security operatives.<sup>62</sup> The chaos led to the withdrawal of three aspirants – Paul Chukwuma, who also resigned from the APC entirely, Obiora Okonkwo, and Chukwuma Umeoji.<sup>63</sup>

At the end of the period allowed for the nomination of candidates, 16 political parties submitted candidates to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). On 4 June 2025, INEC published the final list of candidates for the Anambra State governorship.<sup>64</sup> Based on the list, the incumbent governor, Charles Chukwuma Soludo, who is seeking reelection, emerged as the candidate of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA). Other notable candidates in the list include Prince Nicholas Ukachukwu of the All Progressives Congress (APC), George Moghalu of the Labour Party (LP), and Jude Ezenwafor of the People's Democratic Party (PDP). There are only two female candidates out of the sixteen: Chioma Grace Ifemeludike of the African Action Congress (AAC) and Ndidi Christy Olieh of the National Rescue Movement (NRM). Chioma Grace Ifemeludike of the African Action Congress (AAC), who is 36 years old, is the youngest candidate in the race, while 71-year-old Vincent Chukwurah of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) is the oldest candidate. Notably, none of the candidates participating in the election is a person living with disability (PWD).

59 Adebayo Folorunsho-Francis, Anambra Gov: APGA Pegs Governorship Form at N30m, *Punch*, 27 February 2025, <https://punchng.com/anambra-gov-apga-pegs-governorship-form-at-n30m/>.

60 Vincent Ujumadu, Primaries of Confusion: APC, LP name Soludo's Opponents, *Vanguard*, 10 April 2025, [vanguardngr.com/2025/04/primaries-of-confusion-apc-lp-name-soludos-opponents/](https://www.vanguardngr.com/2025/04/primaries-of-confusion-apc-lp-name-soludos-opponents/).

61 Lawrence Nwimo, Troubling scenes, controversy trail APC primary election in Anambra, *Ikengaonline*, 5 April 2025, <https://ikengaonline.com/2025/04/05/troubling-scenes-controversy-trails-apc-primary-election-in-anambra/>.

62 Anambra guber: Amid tensions, withdrawals, Ukachukwu emerges APC flag bearer, *Vanguard*, 6 April 2025, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2025/04/anambra-guber-amid-tensions-withdrawals-ukachukwu-emerges-apc-flag-bearer/>.

63 Emmanuel Ndukuba, Panic grips Anambra APC as wave of defections follows controversial governorship primary, *Business Day*, 13 April 2025, <https://businessday.ng/politics/article/panic-grips-anambra-apc-as-wave-of-defections-follows-controversial-governorship-primary/>.

64 See Appendix for a detailed description of the Final List of Candidates for the 2025 Anambra State governorship election.

In preparation for the Anambra State governorship election, INEC resumed the Continuous Voters Registration (CVR) exercise on 8 July 2025 in the 326 Wards across the State. The exercise, which was initially scheduled to end on 17 July 2025, ended on 20 July 2025 after a three-day extension. During the registration period, new voters as well as those who wish to transfer their registration to Anambra State from other States or from one location to another within the State were provided the opportunity to do so. Similarly, registered voters whose Permanent Voters Cards (PVCs) were lost or damaged were allowed to apply for a replacement.

Field observers reported that the CVR exercise took place under a generally calm atmosphere in the State, with high citizens' interest, and a high level of professional conduct by many INEC officials. However, observers documented recurring operational weaknesses that marked the CVR exercise in the past, with implications for inclusion and the credibility of the exercise.<sup>65</sup> Six major shortcomings observed include:

1. Gaps in technology - insufficient and unreliable biometric kits, unstable connectivity, and device failures leading to delays and frustration.
2. Operational constraints - over-reliance on a small number of devices, weak site infrastructure, and unstable power/internet connection, reducing throughput.
3. Inclusion shortfalls - limited accommodations for persons with disabilities (PWDs) and older voters (e.g., ramps, Braille, sign-language support).
4. Procedural inconsistencies - queue jumping, favouritism, and non-transparent "private sessions" that undermine fairness.
5. Inadequate security coverage - thin or uneven deployment of security personnel in high-risk areas (e.g., Ihiala, Ogbaru), heightening safety concerns.
6. Communication gaps - inadequate signage and civic messaging, contributing to confusion and dampening participation.

At the end of the registration exercise, INEC announced that 168,187 new voters registered in Anambra State ahead of the governorship election.<sup>66</sup> The breakdown of the figure shows that 58 percent of the new registrants (that is, 97,832) were female, while 42 percent (that is, 70,355) were male. A majority of the new registrants (53.97 percent, or 90,763) were young people aged 18-34. In terms of occupation, 36.92 percent (or 62,157) of the new registrants were businessmen/women, while 26.31 percent (or 44,243) were students. Among Persons with Disability (PWDs) registered, 24.92 percent (or 303) have physical impairment, while 17.02 percent (or 207) have Albinism. By local government area, Idemili North LGA had the highest number of registrants, 246,318 voters (8.79 percent), followed by Awka South LGA with 216,611 (7.73 percent) and Ogbaru LGA with 188,016 (6.71 percent). Dunukofia LGA with 83,580 (2.98 percent) and Anambra West LGA with 71,332 (2.55 percent) recorded the lowest number in the State.

<sup>65</sup> See CDD, Observation Report: Anambra State Continuous Voter Registration Exercise 08 - 20 July 2025, Abuja: Centre for Democracy and Development, 2025.

<sup>66</sup> <https://www.inecnigeria.org/news-letters/2-8-million-voters-cleared-for-anambra-governorship-election-171-groups-seek-party-registration/>.




# DISTRIBUTION OF VOTERS BY LGAs



Total

**168,187** 100%

Source: INEC



Source: INEC

With the new registration figure, the number of registered voters in Anambra State has increased to 2,802,790. This figure is an 11.99 percent increase from the 2021 figure and a decline compared to the previous governorship election cycles. The number of registered voters in Anambra State increased from 1,770,127 in 2013 to 2,064,134 in 2017 (14.24 percent increase) and then to 2,466,638 in 2021 (16.31 percent increase) — a detailed analysis of the Anambra State voter registration figures is provided as an Appendix.

Following the conclusion of the Continuous Voter Registration (CVR) exercise, INEC announced that collection of the Permanent Voters Card (PVC) for voters who registered during the CVR exercise will commence on 22 October and end on 26 October 2025.<sup>67</sup> INEC advised all eligible voters who participated in the CVR exercise to visit the Registration Areas where they initially registered to collect their PVCs within the stipulated period. Observers expect that the more than 31,690 uncollected PVCs in Anambra State before the commencement of the exercise will be issued during the exercise.<sup>68</sup>

Regarding the management of election technology, INEC has expressed commitment to deepen the deployment of technology for voter accreditation and result management. To this end, the Commission plans to conduct a mock accreditation of voters in Anambra State on 25 October 2025.<sup>69</sup> The exercise will enable INEC to test the upgraded BVAS, assess its response time, and ensure seamless transmission of results on the IReV portal ahead of the election. The Commission listed polling units in Awka South, Idemili North, Oyi, Anambra East, Aguata, and Orumba North local government areas as those selected for the exercise. The Commission hopes that lessons learnt from the exercise will be taken into consideration to ensure the seamless deployment of both the BVAS and IReV on Election Day. However, observers are worried that such exercises in the past have not produced the expected results. Ahead of the 2023 general election, the Commission conducted a pilot test of the BVAS, the outcome of which was positive. Yet, the technical glitches in the use of the device marred the outcome of the election. The recurrent failure of election technology during elections and the Presidential Election Tribunal ruling, which have undermined the legal obligation of INEC to deploy technology in elections, are serious concerns ahead of the Anambra State governorship election.

Campaign in public by political parties commenced on 11 June 2025 and will continue until midnight on 6 November 2025. Although, the political parties and candidates have largely adhered to the Regulations and Guidelines for Meetings, Rallies, and Processions, and the security atmosphere has been relatively peaceful<sup>70</sup>, the opposition parties, in particular, have complained about the denial of access to public facilities for electioneering activities. These include the State media, public buildings for meetings, and open spaces for rallies and processions<sup>71</sup>. Specifically, they decried the prohibitive amounts charged for outdoor advertising<sup>72</sup>. These actions are a violation of the Electoral Act 2022, which prohibits the use of incumbency to the advantage or disadvantage of any political party or candidate. INEC

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67 Bode Gbadebo, Anambra Guber: PVC Collection Exercise Begins October 22, Leadership, 19 October 2025, <https://leadership.ng/anambra-guber-pvc-collection-exercise-begins-october-22/>.

68 Gift Habib, Anambra: INEC flags 31,690 Unclaimed PVCs ahead Voter Registration, Punch, 6 June 2025, <https://punchng.com/anambra-inec-flags-31690-unclaimed-pvcs-ahead-voter-registration/>.

69 INEC to conduct mock accreditation for upgraded BVAS in Anambra, Vanguard, 19 October 2025, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2025/10/inec-to-conduct-mock-accreditation-for-upgraded-bvas-in-anambra/>.

70 Ejike Abana, Soludo Campaigns Freely in Once Insecure Ihiala Four Years Later, Anambra Broadcasting Service, 17 October 2025, <https://absradiotelevision.com/soludo-campaigns-freely-in-once-insecure-ihiala-four-years-later/>.

71 Adeniyi Adebote, Concerns Rise Over Democratic Fairness in Anambra Ahead of 2025 Governorship Election, 24 June 2025, <https://ypp.ng/ypp-anambra-election-democracy-2025/>.

72 Ikenna Obianeri, Anambra sets N50m Permit Fee for Governorship Campaign Billboards, Punch, 11 June 2025, <https://punchng.com/anambra-sets-n50m-permit-fee-for-governorship-campaign-billboards/>.

should work with the relevant agencies, such as the Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) and the Advertising Regulatory Council of Nigeria (ARCON), to address the complaints, perhaps, through legal action in the face of prima facie evidence of the violation of the law.

The campaigns have also not focused on issues or manifestoes and at some point social media was awash with insults and inflammatory rhetoric attributed to the incumbent Governor and the candidates of the APC as well as their supporters. Communities were also seen endorsing the Governor and making financial contributions for his re-election campaign.

# Recommendations

## I. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

INEC should take convincing measures to improve public confidence in the credibility of the electoral process by:

- i. Improving adherence of its officials to laid down electoral laws, regulations, guidelines, processes, and procedures based on the lessons learned from past elections, especially the 2021 governorship election and the 2023 general election.
- ii. Ensuring early and adequate training of all categories of ad hoc staff, especially on election technology and results management processes. Lessons from logistics management from the past elections should also be implemented. to avoid late commencement of the election.
- iii. Holding confidence-building dialogues and engagements with different sections of the public in Anambra State to promote openness and transparency of the electoral process.
- iv. Leveraging its relationship with the security agencies through the platform of the Inter-Agency Committee on Election Security (ICCES) to be able to track electoral violence and identify the perpetrators of violence, to arrest and prosecute them.
- v. Strengthening its oversight of the behaviour of political parties in the lead-up to and during elections – strictly enforcing political party regulations and guidelines, and code of conduct for political parties.
- vi. Facilitating high-level peace dialogue that would bring together prominent citizens of the State across the three Senatorial Districts to promote a shared understanding of the need for peaceful elections, including promoting a Peace Accord.

## 2. Political Parties and Candidates

Political parties and their candidates should conduct themselves in an orderly and peaceful manner, and rein in their supporters about democratic conduct, including non-violent conduct and adherence to electoral rules.

## 3. Security Agencies

The security agencies should:

- i. Improve security arrangements by identifying and sanctioning individuals and groups using inflammatory rhetoric, inciting violence, or plotting to perpetrate it.
- ii. Incorporate within the security arrangement for the Anambra State governorship election, the need to block the inflow of armed non-state actors from neighbouring states and to curb the activities of those within the State.
- iii. Strengthen inter-agency cooperation and provide election security in a non-partisan and wholesome manner.

- iv. Work in synergy with INEC to ensure adequate and even deployment of security personnel across polling units and other electoral sites, as well as between urban and rural areas.

#### **4. Civil Society Organizations**

Civil society organizations should:

- i. Work with INEC and other relevant agencies to strengthen civic and voter education across the state to improve voter awareness about peaceful conduct during elections, the need to eschew vote buying and selling, and the civic importance of voting and mandate protection.
- ii. Ensure adequate mobilization of election observers by improving their training and ensuring balanced deployment across the State.
- iii. Work closely with the Police Service Commission to monitor the conduct of security personnel during the election.

# Appendices

## Appendix 1:

### Local Government Areas, their Headquarters and Major Communities

SN	Local Government Area	LGA Headquarters	Major Communities	No.
1	Aguata	Aguata	Achina, Agulezechukwu, Akpo, Amesi, Ekwulobia, Ezinifite, Igbo-Ukwu, Ikenga, Isuofia, Nkpologwu, Oraeri, Uga, Umuchu, Umuona	14
2	Anambra East	Nzam	Aguleri, Enugu-Aguleri, Enugu-otu, Eziagulu-otu, Aguleri, Igbariam, Ikem-Ivite, Mkpunando-out, Nando, Nsugbe, Umueri, Umuoba-Anam	11
3	Anambra West	Otuocha	Ezi-Anam, Ifite-Anam, Innoma, Nzam, Olumbanasa, Oroma-Etiti, Owelle, Ukwalla, Umuenwelum-Anam, Umueze-Anam	10
4	Anaocha	Neni	Adazi-Ani, Adazi-Enu, Adazi-Nnukwu, Agulu, Aguluzoigbo, Akwaeze, Ichida, Neni, Nri, Obeledu	10
5	Awka North	Achalla	Achalla, Amansea, Amanuke, Awba-Ofemili, Ebenebe, Isuaniocha, Mgbakwu, Ugbene, Ugbenu, Urum	10
6	Awka South	Awka	Awka, Amawbia, Nibo, Nise, Ezinator, Isiagu, Mbaukwu, Okpuno, Umuawulu	9
7	Ayamelum	Anaku	Anaku, Ifite-Ogwari, Igbakwu, Omasi, Omor, Umerum, Umueje	7
8	Dunukofia	Ukpo	Ifite-Dunu, Nawgu, Ukpo, Ukwulu, Umudioka, Umunachi	6
9	Ekwusigo	Ozubulu	Ichi, Ihembosi, Oraifite, Ozubulu	4
10	Idemili North	Ogidi	Abacha, Abatete, Eziowelle, Ideani, Nkpor, Obosi, Ogidi, Oraukwu, Uke, Umuoji	10
11	Idemili South	Ojoto	Akwu-Ukwu, Alor, Awka-Etiti, Nnobi, Nnokwa, Oba, Ojoto	7
12	Ihiala	Ihiala	Amorka, Azia, Ihiala, Isseke, Lilu, Mbosi, Okija, Orsumoghu, Ubuluisuzor, Uli	10
13	Njikoka	Abagana	Abagana, Abba, Enugwu-Agidi, Enugwu-Ukwu, Nawfia, Nimo	6
14	Nnew North	Nnewi	Nnewi	1
15	Nnewi South	Ozubulu	Akwaihedi, Amichi, Azigbo, Ebenator, Ekwulumili, Ezinifite, Osumenyi, Ukpor, Unubi, Utuh	10

SN	Local Government Area	LGA Headquarters	Major Communities	No.
16	Ogbaru	Atani	Akili-Ogidi, Akili-Ozozor, Amiyi, Atani, Mputu, Obeagwe, Ochuche-Umuodu, Odekpe, Ogbakuba, Ogwu-Aniocha, Ogwu-Ikpele, Ohita, Okpoko, Osomala, Umunankwo, Umuzu	16
17	Onitsha North	Onitsha	Onitsha	1
18	Onitsha South	Fegge	Onitsha	1
19	Orumba North	Ajalli	Amaetiti, Amaokpala, Ajalli, Awgbu, Awa, Nanka, Ndikelionwu, Ndiokolo, Ndiokpaleke, Ndiokpaleze, Ndiowu, Ndiukwuenu, Okpeze, Oko, Omogho, Ufuma	16
20	Orumba South	Umunze	Agbudu, Akpu, Enugwu-Umuonyia, Eziagu, Ezira, Ihite, Isulo, Nawfija, Ogboji, Ogbunka, Onneh, Owerre-Ezukala, Umuchukwu, Umunze, Umuomaku	15
21	Oyi	Nteje	Awkuzu, Nkwelle-Ezunaka, Nteje, Umunya, Ogbunike	5

## Appendix 2:

### State Constituencies and their Composition

S/N	State Constituency	Composition
1	Aguata I	Nine RAs of Aguta LGA (Achina I, Achina II, Akpo, Amesi, Nkpologwu, Uga I, Uga II, Umuchu I & Umuchu II)
2	Aguata II	Eleven RAs of Aguta LGA (Aguluezechukwu, Ekwulobia I, Ekwulobia II, Ezinifite I, Ezinifite II, Igboukwu I, Igboukwu II, Ikenga, Isuofia, Oraeri & Umuona)
3	Anambra East	The entire area of Anambra East LGA
4	Anambra West	The entire area of Anambra West LGA
5	Anaocha I	Ten RAs of Anaocha LGA (Adazi Ani I, Adazi Ani II, Adazi Enu I, Adazi Enu II, Adazi Nnukwu I, Adazi Nnukwu II, Agulu I, Agulu II, Agulu III & Agulu IV)
6	Anaocha II	Nine RAs of Anaocha LGA (Agulu Uzoigbo, Akwaeze, Ichida I, Ichida II, Neni I, Neni II, Nri I, Nri II & Obeledu)
7	Awka North	The entire area of Awka North LGA
8	Awka South I	Nine RAs of Awka South LGA (Agu Oka, Awka I, Awka II, Awka III, Awka IV, Awka V, Awka VI, Awka VII & Okpuno)
9	Awka South II	Eleven RAs of Awka South LGA (Amawbia I, Amawbia II, Amawbia III, Ezinato/Isiagu, Mbaukwu, Nibo I, Nibo II, Nibo III, Nise I, Nise II & Umuawulu)
10	Idemili South	The entire area of Idemili South LGA
11	Idemili North	The entire area of Idemili North LGA
12	Ihiala I	Nine RAs of Ihiala LGA (Amamu AI, Amamu BII, Amorka, Ihite, Ogbolo, Uli I, Uli II, Uli III & Uzoawka)
13	Ihiala II	Eleven RAs of Ihiala LGA (Azia, Isseke, Okija I – V, Orsumoghu, Ubuluisiuzor, Lilu Mbosi)

S/N	State Constituency	Composition
14	Njikoka I	Eight RAs of Njikoka LGA (Enugwu- Agidi I & II, Enugwu-Ukwu I – IV, Nawfia I & II)
15	Njikoka II	Ten RAs of Njikoka LGA (Abba I & II, Abagana I – IV, Nimo I – IV)
16	Nnewi North	The entire area of Nnewi North LGA
17	Nnewi South I	Nine RAs of Nnewi South LGA (Amichi I –III, Azigbo, Ekwulumili, Osumenyi I & II, Unubi & Utuh)
18	Nnewi South II	Eleven RAs of Nnewi South LGA (Ebenator, Akwa Ihedi, Ezinifite I – III, Ukpokor I – VI)
19	Ekwusigo	The entire area of Ekwusigo LGA
20	Ogbaru I	Six RAs of Ogbaru LGA (Okpoko I – VI)
21	Ogbaru II	Ten RAs of Ogbaru LGA (Akili Ogidi Obagwe, Akili Ozizor, Atani I & II, Iyowa-Odekpe- Ohita, Ochucho Ogbakuba Amiri, Ogwuaniocha, Ogwuikpele, Ossomala & Umunankwo-Mputu)
22	Ayamelum	The entire area of Ayamelum LGA
23	Dunukofia	The entire area of Dunukofia LGA
24	Onitsha North I	Eight RAs of Onitsha North LGA (Inland Town I – VII)
25	Onitsha North II	Seven RAs of Onitsha North LGA (American Quarters, GRA, Ogbe Umuonicha, Trans Nkissi, Waterside Central I & II & Woliwo layout)
26	Onitsha South I	Ten RAs of Onitsha South LGA (Bridge Head I – III, Fegge I – VII)
27	Onitsha South II	Seven RAs of Onitsha South LGA (Odoakpu I – VII)
28	Orumba North	The entire area of Orumba North LGA
29	Orumba South	The entire area of Orumba South LGA
30	Oyi	The entire area of Oyi LGA

## Appendix 3:

### Federal Constituencies and their Composition

S/N	Federal Constituency	Composition	Collation Centre
1	Anambra East/ Anambra West	The entire Geographical Area of Anambra East and West LGAs	INEC Office, Anambra East LGA, Otuocha
2	Onitsha North/ Onitsha South	The entire Geographical Area of Onitsha North and South LGAs	INEC Office, Onitsha North LGA, GRA Onitsha
3	Ogbaru	The entire Geographical Area of Ogbaru LGA	LG Council Hall, Atani
4	Aguata	The entire Geographical Area of Aguata LGA	Aguata LG Secretariat, Ekwulobia
5	Oyi/Ayamelum	The entire Geographical Area of Oyi and Anyamelum LGAs	INEC Office, Oyi LGA, Nteje
6	Awka North/ Awka South	The entire Geographical Area of Awka North and South LGAs	INEC Office, Awka South LGA, Amawbia
7	Njikoka/Dunukofia/ Anaocha	The entire Geographical Area of Njikoka, Dunkofia and Anaocha LGAs	INEC Office, Njikoka LGA, Abagana
8	Idemili North/ Idemili South	The entire Geographical Area of Idemili North and South LGAs	INEC Office, Idemili North LGA, Ogidi
9	Ihiala	The entire Geographical Area of Ihiala LGA	Ihiala LG Council Hall, Ihiala
10	Nnewi North/ Nnewi South/ Ekwusigo	The entire Geographical Area of Nnewi North, Nnewi South and Ekwusigo LGAs	Nnewi North LG Secretariat, Nnewi
11	Orumba North/ Orumba South	The entire Geographical Area of Orumba North/Orumba South LGA	Orumba North LG Council Hall, Ajalli

## Appendix 4:

### Senatorial Districts and their Composition

S/N	Senatorial District	Composition (LGAs)	Collation Centre
1	Anambra North	Onitsha North, Onitsha South, Oyi, Ogbaru, Anambra East, Anambra West, Ayamelum	INEC Office Onitsha North LGA
2	Anambra Central	Awka North, Awka South, Njikoka, Anaoc-ha, Idemili North, Idemili South, Dunukofia	INEC Office Awka South LGA
3	Anambra South	Ihiala, Nnewi North, Nnewi South, Orumba South, Orumba North, Aguata, Ekwusigo	INEC Office Nnewi North LGA

## Appendix 5:

### Electoral Delimitation Data

S/N	LGA	Registered Voters	Polling Units	RAs/Wards	RAC Centres		
					RACs	Super RACs	LGA Total
1.	Aguata	155,881	342	20	2	8	10
2.	Ayamelum	96,947	191	11	11	-	11
3.	Anambra East	110,482	241	15	15	-	15
4.	Anambra West	71,332	164	10	10	-	10
5.	Anaocha	124,075	320	19	2	8	10
6.	Awka North	85,054	150	14	-	5	5
7.	Awka South	216,611	390	20	7	6	13
8.	Dunukofia	83,580	165	14	6	4	10
9.	Ekwusigo	91,549	193	12	10	1	11
10.	Idemili North	246,318	467	12	9	2	11
11.	Idemili South	125,632	243	12	-	5	5
12.	Ihiala	156,715	323	20	8	6	14
13.	Njikoka	119,608	231	18	-	9	9
14.	Nnewi North	166,400	218	10	10	-	10
15.	Nnewi South	102,907	297	20	3	7	10
16.	Ogbaru	188,016	383	16	4	4	8
17.	Onitsha North	183,647	313	15	-	7	7
18.	Onitsha South	168,575	321	17	1	5	6
19.	Orumba North	102,977	253	18	-	8	8
20.	Orumba South	85,767	208	18	6	6	12
21.	Oyi	120,717	207	15	-	5	5
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,802,790</b>	<b>5,720</b>	<b>326</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>200</b>

## Appendix 6:


### Voter Registration Data 2013 - 2025

SN	LGA	2013 Regis- tration	%	2017 Registra- tion	%	2021 Regis- tration	%	2025 Regis- tration	%
1	Aguata	100,083	5.65	121,009	5.86	144,766	5.87	155,881	5.56
2	Ayamelum	57,196	3.23	60,034	2.91	87,128	3.53	96,947	3.46
3	Anambra East	60,818	3.44	72,886	3.53	98,426	3.99	110,482	3.94
4	Anambra West	42,060	2.38	51,012	2.47	62,637	2.54	71,332	2.55
5	Anaocha	76,528	4.32	89,515	4.34	109,860	4.45	124,075	4.43
6	Awka North	44,159	2.49	54,390	2.64	72,036	2.92	85,054	3.03
7	Awka South	118,117	6.67	149,279	7.23	176,812	7.17	216,611	7.73
8	Dunukofia	45,332	2.56	63,861	3.09	74,855	3.03	83,580	2.98
9	Ekwusico	59,014	3.33	73,800	3.58	82,236	3.33	91,549	3.27
10	Demili North	173,832	9.82	178,538	8.65	210,689	8.54	246,318	8.79
11	Idemili South	84,019	4.75	94,197	4.56	112,652	4.57	125,632	4.48
12	Ihiala	111,531	6.30	124,588	6.04	148,407	6.02	156,715	5.59
13	Njikoka	70,519	3.98	88,793	4.30	103,715	4.20	119,608	4.27
14	Nnewi North	112,358	6.35	115,662	5.60	139,368	5.65	166,400	5.94
15	Nnewi South	57,093	3.23	72,431	3.51	89,357	3.62	102,907	3.67
16	Ogbaru	133,717	7.55	149,070	7.22	169,053	6.85	188,016	6.71
17	Onitsha North	117,332	6.63	127,865	6.19	158,804	6.44	183,647	6.55
18	Onitsha South	123,833	7.00	145,876	7.07	156,775	6.36	168,575	6.01
19	Orumba North	61,327	3.46	79,022	3.83	93,608	3.79	102,977	3.67

20	Orumba South	46,100	2.60	63,149	3.06	74,690	3.03	85767	3.06
21	Oyi	75,159	4.25	89,157	4.32	100,764	4.09	120,717	4.31
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1,770,127</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,064,134</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,466,638</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>2,802,790</b>	<b>100</b>
	% Increase			14.24		16.31		11.99	

# Appendix 7:

## Summary of Registered Voters 2025



# Appendix 8:

## Final List of Candidates

### FINAL LIST OF CANDIDATES

### 2025 Governorship Election

**Anambra State** 8th November 2025



	POSITION	CANDIDATE	PWD	AGE	GENDER	QUAL.
1	GOVERNOR	ONYEEZE CHIDI CHARLES	X	54	M	SSC
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	EZEADILI APPOLONIA O.	X	53	F	HND
2	GOVERNOR	NWEKE EZECHUKWU JAPHET	X	55	M	FSLC, WAEC
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	OBI ELVIS ANAYOCHUKWU	X	44	M	FSLC, WAEC
3	GOVERNOR	IFEMELUDIKE CHIOMA GRACE	X	36	F	FSLC, WASSCE DEGREE
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	MGBEMENA KINGSLEY IKECHUKWU	X	43	M	FSLC, WASSCE, BSc
4	GOVERNOR	NWOSU CHIMA JOHN	X	61	M	FSLC, WAEC, IMT (ENUGU), UNILAG BUSINESS SCH
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	NWOBU GEOFFREY NDUBISI	X	64	M	FSLC, WAEC, BSc
5	GOVERNOR	UKACHUKWU NICHOLAS	X	58	M	FSLC, GCE
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	EKWUNIFE UCHE LILIAN	X	54	F	FSLC, GCE, PhD
6	GOVERNOR	SOLUDO CHARLES CHUKWUMA	X	64	M	FSLC, WAEC, BSc (First Class Hons), MSc, PhD (Economics)
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	IBEZIM ONYEKACHUKWU GILBERT	X	49	M	WAEC-SSCE, MBBS
7	GOVERNOR	OTTI CYPRIAN ECHEZONA	X	66	M	FSLC, SSCE, HND
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	EZEIGWE CHUKA SAMUEL	X	45	M	FSLC, SSCE BEng (Hons)
8	GOVERNOR	NWEKE CHRISTOPHER CHUKWUDUBEM	X	44	M	FSLC, WAEC, LLB
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	OKEKE BLESSING EBELE	X	51	F	FSLC, WAEC
9	GOVERNOR	OKEKE CHIKA JERRY	X	51	M	FSLC, SSCE, BSc
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	UGBOMA HAPPINESS	X	45	F	FSLC, GCE, BSc
10	GOVERNOR	MOGHALU GEORGE NNADUBEM	X	62	M	FSLC, High School Abayi, Abia Institute of Management and Technology, Enugu
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	OKARO IFEOMA VERONICA	X	67	F	FSLC, O'Level, DEGREE
11	GOVERNOR	ONYEJEGBU GEOFFREY	X	67	M	FSLC, WAEC, DEGREE
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	ARINZE CHUKWUKA VICTOR	X	42	M	FSLC, SSCE
12	GOVERNOR	NDIDI CHRISTY OLIEH	X	42	F	FSLC, NECO, BSc
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	EGBE EKENE REGINALD	X	41	M	FSLC, WAEC, BSc

	POSITION	CANDIDATE	PWD	AGE	GENDER	QUAL.
13	 GOVERNOR	EZENWAFOR JUDE	X	49	M	NABTEB
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	OKEKE FRANCIS CHUKWUDI	X	49	M	FSCL, SSCE
14	 GOVERNOR	CHUKWURAH VINCENT	X	71	M	GENERAL HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	ODIRA ATUEYI VANATIUS	X	46	M	WAEC, PhD
15	 GOVERNOR	CHUKWUMA PAUL CHUKWUKA	X	47	M	FSLC, WAEC, BA (Philosophy)
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	OKAGBUE UZUEGBUNA IZUCHUKWU	X	47	M	FSLC, BSc (Political Science)
16	 GOVERNOR	UGWOJI UCHENNA MARTIN	X	59	M	FSLC, WAEC
	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	OBI CHIBUZO FAITH	X	41	F	FSLC, WAEC

 **16**  
Political Parties

 **16**  
Governorship Candidates

 **14**  
Male Candidates

 **2**  
Female Candidates

 **0**  
PWDs

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## Appendix 9:

### Result of National and State Assembly Elections during the 2023 General Election

SN	Constituency	Party	No. of Seats
	<b>Senatorial District</b>		
1	Anambra North	LP	2
2	Anambra Central	LP	
3	Anambra South	YPP	1
	<b>Federal Constituency</b>		
1	Aguata	APGA	4
2	Ihiala	APGA	
3	Nnewi North /Nnewi South /Ekwusigo	APGA	
4	Oyi /Ayamelum	APGA	
5	Anambra East / Anambra West	LP	6
6	Awka North /Awka South	LP	
7	Idemili North /Idemili South	LP	
8	Njikoka /Dunukofia / Anaocha	LP	
9	Ogbaru	LP	
10	Onitsha North / Onitsha South	LP	
11	Orumba North / Orumba South	YPP	1
	<b>State Constituency</b>		
1	Aguata	APGA	16
2	Aguata	APGA	
3	Anambra East	APGA	
4	Anambra West	APGA	

SN	Constituency	Party	No. of Seats
5	Anaocha	APGA	
6	Awka North	APGA	
7	Awka South	APGA	
8	Idemili South	APGA	
9	Ihiala	APGA	
10	Ihiala	APGA	
11	Njikoka	APGA	
12	Njikoka	APGA	
13	Ekwusigo	APGA	
14	Dunukofia	APGA	
15	Orumba South	APGA	
16	Oyi	APGA	
17	Anaocha	LP	7
18	Awka South	LP	
19	Idemili North	LP	
20	Onitsha North	LP	
21	Onitsha South	LP	
22	Onitsha South	LP	
23	Orumba North	LP	
24	Ogbaru	PDP	4
25	Ogbaru	PDP	
26	Ayamelum	PDP	
27	Onitsha North	PDP	
28	Nnewi North	YPP	3
29	Nnewi South	YPP	
30	Nnewi South	YPP	







## ABOUT

PLAC hosts the secretariat of the Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room and is a member of its steering committee. The Situation Room provides a co-ordinating platform for civil society engagement on governance issues. It is also a platform for information sharing among civil society groups working on elections and topical national issues. It intervenes in the electoral process by promoting collaboration, proactive advocacy and rapid response to crisis in the electoral process. The Situation Room provides a forum of advance planning, scenario building, evidence based analysis, constructive engagement with various stakeholders in the electoral process and observation of elections.

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